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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2118

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO POLAND REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSES PLO FUNDING

Warsaw PERSPEKTYWY in Polish No 16, 18 Apr 80 p 23

[Interview with Fuad Yasin, PLO representative in Poland, by Malgorzata Terlecka-Rekenis]

[Excerpt] [Question] Whence does the PLO draw the funds for its activities?

[Answer] Primarily from the Palestinian nation. Every Palestinian, wherever he might be, pays not less than three percent of his income to the Palestine National Fund.

[Question] Are these obligations undertaken voluntarily?

[Answer] The PLO published a resolution about the creation of a Palestine Liberation Fund and about the duty of every citizen of Palestine to pay three to six percent of his income. Recognition of this resolution was voluntary.

[Question] Does the income from Palestinian citizens constitute the largest part of the fund?

[Answer] Yes, although we also receive endowments from the Arab countries, especially from the oil countries. The socialist countries and progressive forces throughout the world also help us.

CSO: 2600

ALGERIA

DIALOGUE BETWEEN BERBER PROTESTERS, GOVERNMENT INITIATED

Paris LE MONDE 15 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "The Cultural Opposition in Kabylia: Dialogue Begins Between Striking Workers and Authorities"]

[Text] Algiers: Expansion of the opposition movement in Kabylia and detente in Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou, where workers are continuing their strike-action, but appear to be engaged in a phase of dialogue with the authorities, such were the two principal observations to be made Sunday evening in the capital. The expansion of the movement has taken place on two levels recently: first the geographical, since manifestations by young people claiming "the right to existence of the Berber culture" have not been affecting the great urban centers any longer, but rather villages of average size such as the Ouadhias, the center of the Benni-Yenni or places like Mekla or Djemaa-Saaridj. In Sidi-Aich last Thursday, the prohibition of a concert to have been given by the singer Ferhat and the group called Imazighen Imoula would seem to have been the straw that broke the camel's back. Apparently this was the second time in less than a week that the singer had been called in for questioning, since he had already been interrogated on the occasion of the manifestations in the capital on Monday.

The Berber unrest, according to the anti-repression committee of Tizi-Ouzou, has now reached Little Kabylia as well, and in particular the towns of Dellys and Bordj-Menaiel. The extent of these manifestations has perhaps been exaggerated by the students, but the expansion of the movement to Tizi-Ouzou itself is undeniable. On Sunday the students at the huge Amirouche Lycee went on strike. Imitating their older brothers at the university, they had intended to occupy the premises. Classes also came to a halt at the other two lycees in the city. But is especially important to observe--and this marks

a turning point--that the movement favoring the Berbers and their "freedom of expression" has gone beyond the framework of the educational establishments this time, affecting a public institution such as the city hospital, which, moreover, is located quite close to the campus. A blunder on the part of the authorities, who composed a "message supporting the political administrators of the country" without consulting those affected by it, sparked off a swift reaction. In the course of a general assembly, another "motion of support" was published. But this time it was addressed to the striking students. In just a few hours it succeeded in gathering nearly 500 signatures; as many doctors as paramedical personnel were among the signatories. One letter was sent to President Chadli Bendjedid and another to the ministry of health, to ask them to put a "stop to repression" and to investigate the claims presented by the dissident students. Finally, a "committee of vigilance" was created, and contacts were made with other hospitals.

So the movement has expanded, but an attempt has also been made to establish dialogue. To this end the wali (prefect) of Tizi-Ouzou, Mr Sidi Said, went to the hospital on Sunday to hold discussions with the personnel. After two days of tight control and a closed blockade of the University of Tizi-Ouzou, the forces of order relaxed their terms, and the only evidence of the altercation was the sight of a lone strike picket on Sunday. On the other hand, nine teachers from Tizi-Ouzou were invited by the wali to go to Algiers and meet with the minister of higher education, Mr Abdelhak Berheri. The interview, according to the students, lasted more than three hours. The minister allegedly insisted on the need to begin a dialogue, in order to "dedramatize the situation," and move toward the normalization of affairs. As for the teachers, they requested that on the one hand the forces of repression be withdrawn, and on the other the dossier of the Berber, "which hitherto has been a taboo subject," be finally opened up for discussion. The minister supposedly announced his intention to come to Tizi-Ouzou. Finally a joint delegation of students from Tizi-Ouzou and Algiers was appointed to deliver a kind of "balance-sheet of grievances" to the residence of the president of the republic on Sunday afternoon.

On the side of the authorities, who can take into account the massive support of all the national organizations and, last Sunday especially, that of the General Union of Workers and the Farmers' Union, there is a tendency to emphasize the "marginal" nature of this unrest, orchestrated, they say, by "small groups." It is a fact that in Algiers, the little cell of some hundreds of striking students does not seem to have grown dur-

ing the last few days. The situation might very well develop, however, in the middle of the week, because of tracts circulating in Kabylia to call the "Algerian people" to a day of strikes on next 16 April. It is signed by a committee of support for the students and striking workers; and the students of Tizi-Ouzou deny authorship of the document.

8117
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

ABADAN TELEPHONES--Telephone service between Abadan and other Iranian cities, which was disconnected due to the recent explosion at the communications tower on the Abadan-Ahvaz highway, has been restored. The service had been interrupted for 8 months. A new communications tower has been installed by the General Communications Office of Khuzestan. [GF031733 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 3 May 80]

SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS ELECTED--Seven persons in Kazerun have been elected to the supervisory board for the second phase of the parliamentary elections. [GF031739 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 3 May 80]

KAZERUN GOVERNOR APPOINTED--The governor of Fars has appointed Asghar Shapurian governor of Kazerun. He assumed his duties today. [GF031726 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 3 May 80]

ABADEH WEAPONS TRAINING CLASSES--Weapons training classes have been established by the Abadeh corps of the revolution guards. The classes are held daily from 0530 to 0630 and for 1 hour after evening prayers. The evening classes are for businessmen. The corps of the revolution guards also recently established a national mobilization group for Abadeh high school students. [GF031840 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 3 May 80]

BAVANAT DISTRICT GOVERNOR APPOINTED--The lieutenant governor of Bavanat has been transferred to Shiraz and Yazdani [first name not given] has been appointed district governor. [GF041757 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 4 May 80]

MAMASANI GOVERNOR APPOINTED--According to a PARS report, Asghar Shapurian has been appointed governor of Mamasani rather than governor of Kazerun, as was erroneously reported yesterday. The governor of Mamasani assumed his duties today. [GF041738 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 4 May 80]

AHVAZ SQUARE--The Avaz municipal government has announced that Chahartir square has been renamed Shahid Bandar square. [GF061600 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 6 May 80]

SUGAR SHIPMENT--A ship carrying white sugar is unloading at Bandar Khomeyni. The ship is reportedly carrying 14,000 tons of white sugar. [GF061600 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 6 May 80]

BRIEFS

MURDER OF OPPOSITION LEADER--An Iraqi opposition member, Mr Tahsine al-Chaikhali, known as Yahya al-Iraki, was killed at point-blank range on Monday, 24 March, in Beirut by two unknown hooded persons whose guns had silencers. The victim was a leader of the Union of Iraqi Democrats (opposition to the Baghdad regime). Nine months ago, another leader of this organization, Mr Khaled al-Iraki, was killed the same way. In a communique published on Monday night, the Union of Iraqi Democrats accused the information services of Baghdad of responsibility for the assassination. Mr Tahsine al-Chaikhali, who lived in Beirut since 1973 was a member of the Palestinian Fatah organization. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 26 March 80 p 6] 8696

CSO: 4800

PORI PUBLIC OPINION POLL SHOWS INCREASED ALINEMENT LEAD

TAO60930 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 May 80 pp 1, 8

[Pori public opinion poll: "The Alinement: 45.1 percent; the Likud: 19 percent"]

[Text] The Alinement's electoral strength continues to rise and that of the Likud continues to drop, but the Alinement would not win an overall majority if the elections were to be held today. These are the main findings of the Pori Institute's elections poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ.

According to the findings of the national poll conducted last week, the Alinement would receive 45.1 percent of all the votes and the Likud would receive 19 percent. The Alinement's upward swing thus continues, from 42.8 percent in March to 45.1 percent now, while support for the Likud has dropped from 24 percent in March to 19 percent now; but, as stated, the Alinement would not receive an overall majority.

The poll produced a surprising result in reply to another question, in which the people interviewed were asked "do you think that a government headed by the Alinement would be more successful in coping with the problems confronting the current government, or not?" Despite the rise in the support for the Alinement, 44 percent, in contrast to 32 percent, think that an Alinement government would not be more successful than the Likud government.

Below are the results of the poll, with a comparison with the March poll and the results of the elections to the Ninth Knesset:

	April Poll	March Poll	Ninth Knesset
Likud	19.0	24.0	35.3
Alinement	45.1	42.8	24.6
NRP	8.1	7.6	9.2
Agudat Yisra'el-Po'alei			
Agudat Yisrael	4.6	5.0	4.7
Democrats	0.2	0.8	11.6

Shay	1.9	1.7	
Others	8.2	7.2	8.2
Minorities	N O T	A S K E D	4.6
Abstentions	12.9	10.9	-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

The 8.2 percent of the small parties are split up as follows:

Sheli	2.1
hatehiya	1.6
Rais	1.2
Independent Liberals	0.5
Others	2.8

8.2 percent

An analysis of the socioeconomic composition of the Alinement and the Likud voters shows an outstanding phenomenon of a blurring of the difference between those voting for the two parties. There is now almost no difference in the socioeconomic composition of those voting for the two parties, other than a higher support for the Likud from people originating in the Asian and African countries than from people originating in the countries of Europe and America.

An examination of the abstentions shows that they come primarily from people who previously voted for the Likud or the DMC. Of these, 41 percent voted for the DMC, and in the past only 5.5 percent voted for the Likud and 12 percent for the Alinement. Of these, 16 percent did not vote at all in the previous elections.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women aged 18 and over with the right to vote, who were interviewed personally in their homes in complete privacy.

CSO: 4805

PRESS COMMENTS ON HEBRON MURDER

Review of Morning Press Editorials

TA040645 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 4 May 80

[Excerpt] The murder in Hebron and the lessons it teaches dominate all the newspaper editorials, except for those that were probably written prior to the terrorists' attack.

HA'ARETZ is convinced that the events in the territories harmonize with the PLO's strategy, but says that the intention could not have materialized if the ground was not prepared to absorb the seeds. The Begin government has added its fertilizer to this soil. There is no nation that will tolerate foreign rule without grindings its teeth. The injection of Jewish settlers into densely-populated Arab areas must, in the present circumstances, spur strong opposition. HA'ARETZ notes that we did not come to Israel to live with the Arabs; we came to live as Jews among Jews. The cabinet has one single job now: to work toward a political solution that will relieve us of the burden of controlling a hostile population without forsaking the country's security.

As far as DAVAR is concerned, there is no doubt that the defense establishment should make all the efforts to find the murderers. At the same time, careful scrutiny is required in the more basic area--the political sphere. The cabinet should not be hasty in making decisions on the spur of the moment and under a highly emotional influence. The opponents of fair co-existence with the West Bank Arabs, those belonging to the Gush Emunim school, should point the accusing finger at themselves, rather than at the military government. The cabinet is now more than ever before walking a tight rope: it is now difficult to navigate the ship between extremists flanking you on both sides. The test of the Israeli policy will not be in furor and retaliatory reactions but in the correct proportion between foiling terrorist attacks, punishing murderers and far-sighted political wisdom.

'AL HAMISHMAR notes that, despite all the pain and mourning on the loss of lives; with all the anger at the cowardly murderers who operated from an ambush, we must admit that the very attempt to settle [Jews in] houses in Hebron was wrong. It widened the areas of friction and provided

ammunition to instigators. The strong hand against murders must be coupled with a sane and far-sighted policy.

THE JERUSALEM POST, too, states that for the perpetrators of murder in Hebron there is no difference between the old Hadassah building there or the children's house at Migav 'Am. Moreover, the more helpless the target, the more intense the pull on the trigger. Yet even as we mourn the dead and nurse the wounded, the government must look beyond the iron logic of violence and repression. A settlement policy which is directed at the heart of Arab population, which lacks defense priorities, which is instigated not by government decisions but by Gush Enunim civil disobedience is plainly not the way. It only erodes national unity and national morale and has, in fact, brought us to the present point.

HATZOFE notes the similarities between the Friday night murder and the pogroms that took place [in Hebron] more than 50 years ago [in 1929]. Hence a policy of only reacting without taking preventive measures is insufficient. A long-range determined policy should be taken, based on uprooting the PLO gangs in the territories, preventing any sort of incitement and planning and establishing a large-dimension settlement campaign that will be a wall of defense for the country and its citizens.

HAMODI'A, too, thinks that perhaps the punitive policy is no longer sufficient at this stage and cannot restore order in Judaea and Samaria or prevent a deterioration in Gaza. More determination should be shown toward the rioters.

Leniency Criticized

TA040938 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 4 May 80

[Review of midday press editorials]

[Text] The two papers write about the massacre in Hebron. YEDI'OT AHARONOT criticizes Minister Weizman sharply, saying that what occurred would not have happened were it not for the path adopted by the Defense Ministry in the territories, namely to consider its main duty as limiting our forces and forsaking them in the hands of instigators there. If we do not advocate the dismissal of the minister responsible for this landslide, it is only because we want to avoid taking another step which can be interpreted as another PLO achievement, the newspaper says.

MA'ARIV says that the political negotiations and the efforts to establish good relations with the inhabitants of the territories did not necessitate forgiving acceptance of those who threw stones, set up barricades or attacked military and civilian vehicles. It is exactly the strangulation of the attempted uprising at the first stages that would have prevented the deterioration of the security situation and would have indirectly contributed to progress in the political process.

Editorials on Territorial Policies

TA050645 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 5 May 80

[Review of morning press editorials]

[Excerpt] Most newspapers write about the policy in the territories in the aftermath of the murder in the Hadassah building in Hebron.

HA'ARETZ thinks that the settlements are not the only obstacle in our efforts to get through to the hearts of the Arabs of the territories. However, there is no doubt that they constitute an obstacle which must be removed. So far, the government's decision to set up field school and a header yeshiva in Hebron has not materialized because the Knesset foreign affairs and security committee deferred the discussion of the appeal submitted by the Democratic Movement ministers. The rejection of this appeal will only add to the damage already done by the government. If this appeal is accepted, the Arabs may interpret the move as the first fruits of the murder on Friday night. The newspaper advises that, therefore, it would be wiser not to make any decision on the subject.

THE JERUSALEM POST says that it was right and proper for the cabinet unanimously to condemn and reject the criticism leveled at the defense minister in the wake of the murder in Hebron. However, it seems that the prime minister--who stood by Weizman's side--is now expecting a similar gesture of loyalty on the part of his defense minister. Regarding the defense minister's handling of the territories, the newspaper says that more than once there has been speculation that Minister Weizman does not dedicate a great deal of time to this subject because he disagrees with the government's settlement policy. If indeed this is the case this fact cannot be ignored. The principle of collective responsibility regarding events in the territories applies to Minister Weizman as much as to all his colleagues in the cabinet.

'AL HANISHMAR writes that the cabinet definitely backed the defense minister yesterday. However, the reservations reserved regarding criticism leveled against him do not imply that the cabinet has indeed drawn the necessary conclusions from the events in the West Bank. The murderers should be apprehended and tried, but at the same time one should be careful not to harm law-abiding people. Regarding the future, it is of utmost importance that an effort be made to restore peace along with adopting a strong-arm policy against every murderer and rioter.

HATZOFE writes that the murder in Hebron means that the inhabitants of the territories have switched from a war of stones and sticks to an overt armed war, which is fought by altogether different rules. The policy in the territories should be reexamined since the liberal policy has failed. There is a big difference between a strong and soft policy, and a logical policy which will impose order.

Comments on Security in West Bank

TA060657 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 6 May 80

[Review of morning press editorials]

[Excerpts] HA'ARETZ discusses the autonomy talks in Herzliyya. The paper feels that Israel could soften its stand on certain issues such as the voting rights for east Jerusalem Arabs for the Administrative Council. However, on the question of security and internal security in particular it is the Egyptians who should show some flexibility. HA'ARETZ considers the Egyptian decision to suspend the activities of the working groups until there is a solution of the security issue to be a pressure tactic, often used at a critical stage in negotiations.

DAVAR comments on yesterday's Knesset debate on the Hebron terrorist attack. To post a guard with every settler in the territories would make a mockery of coexistence, according to the paper, and every routine activity of the settlers would mean that the army would be diverted from its task of defense preparation. Before any blame is placed on the defense establishment the Qiryat Arba' resident should explain what kind of coexistence will be maintained between Arabs and Jews if every settler has a soldier watching over him.

Heading its editorial a vicious circle, THE JERUSALEM POST warns that if tough measures on the West Bank mean, as MK Arens says, that Israel is there to stay, this in some eyes could only be a prescription for more trouble. It would lead to a cycle of more violence and repression, exactly what the PLO hoped for. It could result in an end to the autonomy proposal and crushing international pressure against Israel. The time has come to refrain from provocative actions in the West Bank and to stop Hebron-type settlements, according to the POST.

Comments on Reaction to Hebron

TA060955 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 6 May 80

[Review of midday press editorials]

[Text] MA'ARIV criticizes yesterday's Knesset debate on the events in Hebron. The paper believes no answer was given to the painful question of Jewish-Arab coexistence in Eretz Yisra'el. MA'ARIV also thinks it was wrong to hold a public Knesset debate a few days following the murder; the debate should have been delayed until after the mourning period so that the events could be discussed with proper seriousness and a responsible national outlook.

YEDI'OT AHARONOT believes this is not the proper time for opposition activity. According to the paper both coalition and opposition, the entire people, should be enlisted to move the country out of the mire or to speed up the elections.

Comments on Autonomy Talks

TA070722 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 7 May 80

[Review of morning press editorials]

[Excerpt] This morning the papers deal with the crisis in the autonomy talks, the repercussions of the Hebron murder and several additional issues.

Deadblocked Talks--this is the headlines of DAVAR's editorial this morning. The paper says that the various maneuvers of the three delegations, at best, maintain the appearance of momentum without acceleration. In the face of the Egyptian proposal we should remember that the autonomy negotiations are a political struggle in which each party can adopt maneuvers and tricks. We need not get excited over every Egyptian move that is reported to bode the impending end of the peace process. At the same time, DAVAR states, we should not get enthusiastic over accidental progress in the talks of the kind the defense minister will surely try to achieve in his visit to Egypt tomorrow. As long as the basic positions of the parties are unchanged the gap will remain as it is.

THE JERUSALEM POST says a compromise is needed in the autonomy talks and calls on the Egyptians to take the lead in this. Egypt is the one who is pushing for real progress by the target date, so it will undoubtedly not want to be the element to curb such progress.

'AL HAMISHMAR says that the wording of the Egyptian proposal presented by General 'Ali is very grave. The paper believes this is Egypt's initial position, but the blame for the situation should be put on the Likud government for raising the autonomy solution in addition to its imprudent, unwise policy in the territories.

HATZOFE says that the crisis atmosphere in the talks has dissipated, but this does not dull the poignancy of the disagreements. The Egyptian document was formulated before the Hebron massacre, but the waves of anti-Jewish violence clearly prove the absurdity of the Egyptian security plan for the autonomy.

Further Comments on Autonomy Talks

TA070919 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 7 May 80

[Review of midday press editorials]

[Text] Both papers write about the crisis in the autonomy talks. YEDI-OT AHARONOT says it is impossible to claim that the crisis has developed due to the sudden Egyptian proposals, as it were. The Egyptian demands were known to us earlier. The crisis erupted because the parties have simply

reached the substantive questions now and are faced with a deadend. The paper suggests that the negotiators be careful not to make concessions on the most important points out of fear of a breakdown in the negotiations.

MA'ARIV writes that it is not the time limit that is preventing the parties from reaching an agreement by 26 May. It is the polarized differences in the conceptions of the two parties. When Egypt says autonomy it does not mean an arrangement that is a little different from Israel's view but a completely opposite one.

CSO: 4805

NEW SETTLEMENTS TO BE SET UP ON GOLAN HEIGHTS

TA051145 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 5 May 80 p 1

[Article by Menahem Horowitz]

[Text] Five new settlements including two religious ones will be set up in various parts of the Golan Heights in the coming months. Some of them will be set up as observation posts first and will later turn into settlements in the full sense of the word.

The planning of most of the new settlements had ended and the nuclei that will settle them are in various stages of training in the Golan. Two settlements will be established in the north of the Golan Heights, in the area of the (Qata) Mountain, near Birkat Ram. A small state-owned area has been allocated there and the Agriculture Ministry and Jewish Agency intend to set up an observation post in the place at first.

Another settlement whose planning is nearly finished will be set up on the (Wast)-Mas'Adah Road. Two religious settlements will be established in the center of the Golan. One will be east of the road running across the Golan, near (Tall Abu-Qatif) and the other in the (Mizra')-al-Qunaytirah region. The settlers' nucleus for this latter settlement has begun organizing in Ramat Magshimim.

Another settlement will be set up in the south of the Golan Heights, opposite the mouth of the Yarmuk, not far from the meeting of [the Israeli and Jordanian] borders. This settlement will belong to Ihud Haqevutzot Vehakibbutzim.

It has been learned that most of the structures for the new settlements will be brought to the settlement sites in the coming days.

In the meantime the settlers of Sha'al in the south of the Golan have moved to their new permanent site in the (Wust) area, after 2 years of waiting. The settlement which is affiliated with the Betar Movement is going to receive additional seven families shortly.

GOVERNMENT LEGAL ADVISER SUBMITS OPINION ON WEST BANK STATE LAND

TA050920 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 May 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Dan Margalit]

[Text] Yesterday, Government Legal Adviser Yitzha Zamir presented to the cabinet the difficulties that will be caused in international law and with the Camp David commitments if it is decided to pass legislation on land in Judaea and Samaria, in regions which are Eretz Yisra'el indeed but which are not part of the state of Israel.

Opening a calm and matter-of-fact cabinet discussion on the issue of the legal status of lands in the held territories Zamir noted that hundreds of thousands of governmental lands have so far been found in Judaea and Samaria.

Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon remarked during the discussion that he does not disagree with the data presented by Professor Zamir. The governmental lands may be so registered but they have, in fact, long been held by Arab inhabitants who use them for residence and agriculture (this followed Zamir's remarks that the findings of the land survey have so far pointed to hundreds of thousands of governmental lands; according to an earlier survey there is a million dunams of such land).

Minister Sharon added that settlements such as Ari'el, Elqana, Efrat, Giv'on and Qedumim suffer from a shortage of land. Most of the available land is located in arid regions in Judaea but since it is urban settlements that are in question it is impractical to offer them a distant tract of land which an urban settlement (in contrast with an agricultural one) cannot use.

Zamir, who analyzed the land situation, claimed that in contrast to about a million available dunams the government's settlement program talks of 20,000 dunams only, "So one could say that the government can continue with the present policy which upholds the establishment of settlements and execute the settlement program according to this policy." Zamir is indeed aware of the fact that problems can evolve in some settlements which lack

governmental land reserve, but the question is whether this justifies the act of legislation which is legally and politically difficult.

a proposal has lately been raised to make use of the Jordanian law which enables the expropriation of private land for public needs and the question is whether it is possible to make practical use of this law for the needs of Jewish settlement in Judaea and Samaria. Professor Zamir promised the ministers to examine this problem at next week's cabinet meeting. The legal adviser emphasized that the proposed legislation is unconventional.

Minister Sharon still believes that the Justice Ministry adheres to a dangerous position when it claims that the fate of the existing settlements need be feared. An absentee who has recently returned to Judaea and Samaria received a tract of land in the heart of the Mehola settlement. Another absentee has already appealed to a court and this phenomenon may further spread when the autonomy is established. Many other ministers have not expressed their opinion on the issue yet.

CSO: 4805

HUSAYN REPORTEDLY PREPARED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

TA061235 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 May 80 pp 3,6

[Article by Ron Ben-Yishay, Washington]

[Excerpt] King Husayn of Jordan is prepared to enter into direct negotiations with Israel, but not in the framework of the Camp David process, and in cooperation with the PLO. This idea was raised by Husayn about 2 weeks ago in a conversation with a U.S. personality. The meeting was held in the king's palace in Amman.

The Jordanian king said in that conversation that the failure of the autonomy debates was certain in his opinion, and that after the failure there would be a deadlock, which would finally lead to war. Because of this--the U.S. personality said--Husayn, according to him, is prepared to save the situation from the crisis, but this on condition that Jordan will not have to enter into confrontation with Iraq, for example, which rejects the Camp David process. Husayn said that direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel were possible if four conditions were fulfilled:

--It turns out that the autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt have reached a deadlock and can no longer continue;

--The negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will not in any way be linked with the Camp David agreements and Egypt will not take part in them;

--The Arab delegation to the negotiations will be composed of representatives of Jordan and the PLO. Husayn explained to his U.S. interlocutor that some of the Palestinians in the delegation would come from PLO supporters in the territories, and the others--from the PLO political establishment outside the territories;

--The topic of the negotiations would be the final status of the territories and the inhabitants; and not the autonomy. Husayn does not dismiss the possibility of autonomy in the territories, but only as an interim stage in preparation for the final stage to be agreed upon in the negotiations.

The Jordanian king told his guest that people from the PLO had begun exploratory talks with him about the possibility of establishing a federation between the Palestinian entity to be established in the territories and Jordan. The people who are conducting these contacts in the name of the PLO belong to the Fatah organization and for the moment they do not claim to represent the PLO as a whole.

According to him, Husayn is not enthusiastic about agreeing to the proposal for fear that the federation with the Palestinian entity will be an opening for an attempt to take control of Jordan.

The U.S. personality drew the king's attention to an article written by M'k Shim'on Peres in the monthly FOREIGN AFFAIRS, where he expressed his willingness for territorial compromises. Husayn said that he was aware of the article's contents and that on the surface the article gave him reason to hope. However, according to him, in the past he had been able to study the views of Yitzhaq Rabin and Shim'on Peres, and, on the basis of this information, he was not pinning any great hopes on a dramatic change in the Israeli approach if the rule in Israel changes.

Another interesting point in the talk with Husayn was in connection with Syria. In the king's opinion, the Syrians will not be capable of undermining negotiations with Israel, according to his program, because President Hafiz al-Asad, as well as his aides, "are involved over their heads" in the internal situation in Syria. He does not expect any significant opposition from any other Arab country, other than Libya which is in any case suspending the aid it promised Jordan.

Saudi Arabia will also not oppose any action that would decrease the danger of polarization in the Middle East, according to Husayn.

It emerges that the only country whose views are taken into consideration by Husayn is Iraq. This is because Iraq is today the dominant military force in the area and because Baghdad is giving much greater economic and military aid to Jordan than what is being given by the United States or Saudi Arabia.

The king spoke with fury about the scorn with which the Carter administration is treating him. According to him, even in the Camp David agreements Jordan's honor was insulted when, without consulting it, the roles it was to play in the peace process were dictated in the form of near orders.

The second insult was Husayn's invitation to meet with Carter in Washington, which was given to him at the time by Ambassador Sol Linowitz--an invitation that was afterward canceled without explanation because of Carter's meetings with al-Sadat and Begin.

PREMIER KHALIL ON IMPORTANCE OF STYLE, PRIORITIES

TA021124 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 May 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by 'Oded Zaray and Dan Margalit]

[Text] The autonomy talks will not begin as intensively as was expected and up to now the talks have not really begun yet, just the deliberations about the agenda and the style in which they should be conducted. Egyptian Prime Minister Dr Mustafa Khalil said this last night to the HA'ARETZ correspondents at the end of the first day of the autonomy talks being held in the Accadia Hotel in Herzliya.

It was reported last night that Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman has accepted the invitation of the chairman of the Ministerial Autonomy Committee, Dr Yosef Burg, to return to the committee and deal with security matters.

Dr Khalil attributes great importance to the order, the style and the priorities of the issues, according to which the intensive talks are to be conducted and which will serve as a guarantee for progress and the achievement of an agreement. According to the Egyptians, this is the reason why the ceremonial opening session, which had been scheduled for yesterday afternoon, was canceled; because the sides had not yet reached an agreement regarding the agenda for the talks. Dr Khalil commented that the head of the Israeli delegation, Dr Burg, had transferred the points raised in connection with the determination of the order of the talks to Prime Minister Menahem Begin for consultation and for the moment they were waiting for the Israeli reply.

Answering a question by the HA'ARETZ correspondent, Dr Khalil said that Egypt attributes great importance to the security issue which, according to him, necessarily has implications concerning all the other issues of the autonomy talks.

In accordance with this, the issue should be defined in detail, this being in accordance with the Camp David agreements. In the Egyptians' opinion, at this stage the debate on the security issue should not be postponed,

because of its importance and its implications regarding the progress or delaying of the talks and so they are still waiting for Israel's reply concerning the establishment of a special committee to discuss this issue.

In reply to another question, Dr Khalil said that his staying in Israel until the end of this stage of the talks, at the end of next week, necessarily depends on his presence at all the deliberations, but this would be decided after settling the agenda for the talks. However, it has been learned that Dr Khalil apparently intends to return to Cairo before the end of the deliberations, while the other members of the Egyptian ministerial team will continue with the talks.

Dr Burg recently appealed several times to Minister Weizman about his re-incorporation in the autonomy talks. Yesterday the Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon also begged him to return to the talks, mainly because of the need to deal with security affairs. Egyptian and U.S. sources last night expressed the hope that Weizman's incorporation would give the negotiations a new impetus. Last night an Israeli spokesman reported that up to now Egypt had not formally submitted any new proposals, and Israel was not expecting Egyptian replies to the four points the prime minister presented in Washington because they were submitted to Washington, not to Cairo.

This morning the ministerial committee guiding the legal working committee is meeting with the aim of trying to settle an agreed agenda. The deliberations of the guiding ministerial committee, which includes Israeli Minister of Justice Shmu'el Tamir and Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Ghali, as well as U.S. Ambassador James Leonard, are a continuation of the deliberations held yesterday.

CSO: 4805

KHALIL ON WEST BANK EXPULSIONS, SECURITY COMMITTEE, AUTONOMY TALKS

TA040952 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 May 80 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Dr Mustafa Khalil, Egyptian prime minister, by Smadar Peri on 3 May, place not given]

[Text] "The expulsion of the two mayors is a grave punishment. Every citizen has the right to live in his country. Friday's events in Hebron will have no effect on Egypt's position in the autonomy talks. We have not yet reached the stage when it will be possible to incorporate the Palestinians into the negotiations. There is an escalation in activity in the West Bank because of the government of Israel's insistence on establishing settlements. It is the precondition Israel presented that is delaying the opening of the plenum of autonomy ministers. The Egyptian document containing the seven position points was brought to Israel's knowledge verbally, by Dr Burg. Egypt is not preventing Egyptian citizens from visiting Israel." These remarks were made yesterday by Egyptian Prime Minister Dr Mustafa Khalil in an exclusive interview with 'AL HAMISHMAR.

[Question] Will the assault in Hebron have an effect on the autonomy talks?

[Answer] First of all, I want to point out that Egypt regrets Friday's events in Hebron. I want to add that the Hebron action is a proof that without achieving a peaceful solution, no moves made under a rule of military conquest will provide the area with security. Therefore I think we must continue to concentrate our efforts in order to reach an agreement on the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

[Question] Following the events in Hebron, have the inhabitants of the West Bank "got lost" in the negotiating talks?

[Answer] This was a regrettable incident and an examination should be made of how responsible the inhabitants were for this occurrence. I believe that if we are able, in the course of the negotiations talks, of giving them proof that they will receive full autonomy and that the military conquest will come to an end—we will be able to include the local inhabitants.

[Question] How was the action by Fatah members in Hebron understood by the Egyptian delegation?

[Answer] In my view, this is a further proof that there is an escalation in activity in the West Bank because of the Israeli settlement policy that started, in the first stage, on Arab land in the West Bank--in places where there were no Arab settlements--and after that, inside the Arab towns themselves. I believe that these settlements are not serving Israel's security but, on the contrary, they are arousing conflict and causing instability in the West Bank.

[Question] But the Government of Israel claims that without the presence of IDF forces the country's security will be undermined.

[Answer] And I claim that the presence of the Israeli military forces is what is causing the instability, the lack of quiet.

[Question] How did the Egyptian delegation receive the Israeli Government's decision to expel the two mayors from the West Bank?

[Answer] Every citizen has the right to live in his country. The expulsion is a grave punishment.

[Question] What, in fact, is the argument preventing the opening of the autonomy talks in the current round, on the ministerial level?

[Answer] The argument is not over substance. Israel presented a precondition and is demanding that the issue of security in the West Bank should be in its hands and it is demanding that Egypt agree to this. We will not be able to agree to this. We regard the current position of the Government of Israel as a retreat from the Camp David agreements.

[Question] How does the Egyptian side feel about 26 May. Is this still a "target date?"

[Answer] If we concentrate our efforts and if Israel accepts the documents of the Egyptian position on the security issue, we will be able to arrive at several points. I do not believe that we will reach full agreement by 26 May.

[Question] Israel claims that the document of the seven Egyptian points which was published in the Egyptian communications media has not to this day been formally presented.

[Answer] The four points Israel is presenting were read in the papers. No documents have yet been exchanged. I gave Egypt's seven-point document verbally to the head of the Israeli delegation, Dr Burg.

[Question] What does the Egyptian delegation want to leave Israel with at the end of the current round of talks?

[Answer] We want to conclude the current round with proof that there is agreement between the two sides on certain points.

[Question] One last question on the normalization issue: Why have Israeli tourists been wandering through Cairo and Alexandria ever since the peace agreement was signed, while Egyptian tourists are not arriving in Israel?

[Answer] I want to emphasize, there are no orders from on high, nor are there any obstacles directed at interfering with Egyptian citizens and tourists coming to Israel. There is a law in Egypt permitting every citizen to go to any country in the world.

[Question] But Egyptian tourists are not coming and we know about Egyptian citizens who asked for and received visas at the Israeli Embassy in Cairo and did not reach Israel.

[Answer] On our part there is nothing stopping Egyptian citizens from visiting Israel. Give me a list of the names of those Egyptian citizens who asked to go to Israel and were confronted with a refusal and I will look into the issue.

CSO: 4805

EGYPT'S GENERAL 'ALI INTERVIEWED ON AUTONOMY TALKS, RELATIONS

TA051210 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 May 80 p 3

[Article by Smadar Peri]

[Excerpts] The murder in Hebron will not affect the negotiations, at least not from the point of view of the Egyptian stand. This is the prevalent tone emerging from the reports of the Egyptian autonomy delegation members. In addition, no changes will be introduced into the 7-point working paper prepared in Cairo and brought to Tel Aviv [in response to Begin's 5-point document].

The Egyptian defense minister has always believed that mutual trust has to be cultivated between the two parties. The "chemical" trust between him and his Israeli colleague Weizman has been established and fostered through cooperation and effort. Today, after the terrorist act in Hebron, 'Ali develops the theory of building trust explaining that one should aim at creating trust between the two peoples living alongside each other in the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip, and in Israel.

"Israel does not reveal signs that it is serious and determined in its intention to solve the settlement problem." Minister 'Ali explains that Israel's policy over the past year has given the West Bankers, the PLO and the Arab countries the feeling that Israel wants to remain in the status of a conqueror and not to solve the problems.

Today too Egypt continues to adhere to President al-Sadat's proposal to try to apply the autonomy in Gaza at the first stage. To those Israelis who have lately been convinced that it will indeed be easier to apply the autonomy in Gaza if a solution is really intended 'Ali says that as a first step Egypt demands that general principles be applied both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while the total application be exercised in Gaza first.

The 26th of May declared by the Egyptians as the "target date" has lost its threatening sting. The marathon discussions have "lost their high profile" and the Egyptian delegation members do not treat them as a sword hanging over the negotiators' heads any more.

Giving momentum to the normalization process and putting it in practice can be attributed to Egypt's Defense Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali and the Tel Aviv Defense Ministry (Minister Ezer Weizman, Maj Gen Avraham Tamir and Brig Gen Dov Si'on). There are "creakings" still but the Cairo Defense Ministry does not accept the Israeli contention that the normalization between the two peoples is a one-way street with only Israelis visiting the streets of Cairo and Alexandria.

Minister 'Ali takes out a list containing the figures of the Egyptian citizens who received visas and arrived in Tel Aviv. These figures are small but the explanation in Cairo is that Israel is no "attraction" for the wealthy people looking for more "exotic" tourist sites. In any event, the trade, culture and aviation agreements do not enjoy a permanent status yet--they still require the approval of the Egyptian parliament.

Some Israeli ministries wonder if after signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt will encourage African countries to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. Senegal, Nigeria and Gabon lead the list of Israeli hopes. Minister 'Ali explains that "this subject concerns the African countries" adding that the oil ties and the funds they receive from Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia are the elements which dictate the political moves in African countries. The only optimism revealed by 'Ali on this issue is connected with the achievement of a comprehensive peace. If this is achieved, Israel's Africa days may certainly be revived.

Increased Egyptian-U.S. defense cooperation, that has been demonstrated primarily by the signing of the contract for U.S. modern arms supply to Egypt as well as the U.S. planes' use of an Egyptian base for the abortive operation in Iran, gives rise to an uneasy atmosphere in the talks. Minister 'Ali restricts himself to generalizations: "The Egyptian interests concentrate on preventing Soviet penetration into the region." The U.S. ally is the Egyptian reply to the Soviet belt of terror whose arms spread to the Iranian borders, Yemen and the African countries "surrounding Egypt" as the Egyptian minister defines it.

How does Cairo define the U.S. rescue attempt? "A misfortune." When did the Egyptian defense minister who visited Washington together with President al-Sadat 10 days before the U.S. invasion into Iran learn of this?

"When--Minister 'Ali raises his eyebrows--after the failure of course."

CSO: 4805

GENERAL 'ALI COMMENTS ON SECURITY GUARANTEES

TA041022 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 May 80 p 1

[Article by 'Oded Zaray]

[Text] "Egypt understands and takes into account Israel's fears and needs on security issues and it is a fact that we included security guarantees for Israel in the peace agreement, on the same basis we claim that we must sit down and discuss the security guarantees and demands of all the sides and we must also discuss the share of each side in defending the just and comprehensive peace we are all aiming for," Egyptian Defense Minister Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali said last night in an exclusive interview with HA'ARETZ.

The autonomy talks will be renewed this evening in the Herzliyya Accadia Hotel in a meeting between the three delegation heads, in an attempt to overcome the procedural problems, while the security issue is still the center of the Egyptian delegation's problems.

General 'Ali pointed out that the decision that the security issue is the sole responsibility of Israel completely contradicts the Camp David agreements which determine that security guarantees should be given to all sides. According to him, the Israel citizen's fears of a possible attack from outside the West Bank or of terror actions from within the West Bank meet the fears of the inhabitants of these territories of the Israeli settlements, that they represent the beginning of annexation and conquest, in addition to the Israeli forces and the military government remaining there. "The Camp David agreement," he said, "provided a framework solution to these fears and we must discuss solutions and practical moves."

He also pointed out that the agreements determined that the settlements were illegal, all the more so since powerful Israel is capable of containing any external attack, while the fact of the establishment of peace with Egypt represents a guarantee for peace between the Arab countries and Israel.

With regard to an IDF withdrawal to defined points in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, General 'Ali believes that this can be discussed with full flexibility. As military personnel, he stressed, we know very well the foundations of security and defense and we will not disagree over this problem. He welcomed Minister 'Ezer Weizman's incorporation into the talks and pointed out that their joint work in implementing the peace agreement and establishing the normalization in a short time was creating foundations for continuing cooperation and success. General 'Ali also has views on the issue of the war on terror.

CSO: 4805

OFFICIALS COMMENT ON EXPULSIONS

Weizman: 'No More Expulsions'

TA061112 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 6 May 80 p 1

[Article by Yitzhaq Shor]

[Text] The policy that should be followed--'Ezer Weizman said yesterday to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee--is to isolate the islands of rioting and not act with revenge toward settlements where there have not been strikes. The anger that has accumulated in Hebron should not be transferred to other places.

According to the minister, "There are also problems with irresponsible Jewish elements. They have explosions of rage and, in order to prevent actions by them, the IDF is being forced to move forces in the area." The minister expressed the hope that there will be no need for any more expulsions.

Weizman said that he normally accepted the advice of the general security service about the West Bank, but there had been cases when we had not accepted the advice based on the political consideration that the autonomy talks should not be harmed. The minister rejected the talk about a hard or soft hand. In his opinion, the circumstances and the timing should be taken into consideration. "If I were to publicize the strikes prevented by security forces' actions--you would raise your hats" Weizman said.

Zamir Casts Doubts on Legality

TA061114 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 6 May 80 p 1

[Article by Dalya Shehori]

[Text] Government Legal Adviser Prof Yitzhaq Zamir last night expressed his opposition to the immediate expulsion of all the members of the National Guidance Committee in the territories. Professor Zamir, who was speaking at the cabinet session, was reacting to a proposal put forward by Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon to expel immediately all the members of the

committee. Professor Zamir said that a collective expulsion would not stand up in the high court of justice, as it was necessary to show a link between the substance of the crime and the person responsible for it and no such link existed on the surface between the murder act in Hebron and the other members of the committee who had not been expelled.

It has been learned that the possibility of bringing back the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the Kaddi of Hebron is not to be dismissed, but this will not be in the near future and will take at least another 6 months.

CSO: 4805

WEIZMAN ON LONG-RANGE POLICY IN TERRITORIES

TA041210 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 May 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ya'Aqov Erez]

[Text] "I will continue to serve as minister of defense as long as I believe and feel that I am continuing to serve the security establishment. As soon as I have come to the parting of the ways or to the end of the road, I will draw the conclusions. Our security policy in the territories is a long-range one and its purpose is to live in this region and, in any event, to live with the Arab population in Eretz Yisra'el, but certainly not with those who come to murder us," Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman said yesterday at an exclusive interview with MA'ARIV.

These remarks were made in reply to a question about whether the minister of defense intended to resign from his post in the wake of the claims that have been made against him after the Hebron murder.

'Ezer Weizman added: "The line we have taken up to now has been harmed, although I believe it is the correct line."

Referring to the steps being taken now, he said: "We are tightening up the military supervision with the aim of exposing the murderers and preventing terrorist activities. If there is anyone who, for political reasons, does not accept this, he should act politically.

Mr Weizman stressed: "I want to remind you that in such difficult cases as these, people forget the past, previous successes. They forget that many inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza are not violent and that the security establishment is active in all sectors. There is a saying about this, that success has many fathers, a regrettable event leaves an orphan."

The defense minister was asked to react to remarks made against him yesterday, especially by Mr Elyaqim Ha'etzani from Qiryat Arba'. Mr Weizman said: "I have not followed in Mr Ha'etzani's footsteps. We followed a policy based on consistency, but a policy of an attempt to find a way to coexistence."

The minister pointed out that last week, before the murder in Hebron, the security establishment had made decisions to follow a policy of a strong hand in the territories. He said: "If this wave continues, the strong hand will be reinforced, but muscle will not overpower wisdom. A strong hand should also be used with wisdom."

He stressed that the terrorist activity in the territories, which has increased over the last few months, springs from the policy of the PLO whose entire objective is to foil the peace efforts, damage Israeli-Egyptian relations and prevent progress in the autonomy talks.

Mr Weizman commented that what was happening now was a part of "the battle for Eretz Yisra'el." He pointed out that not all the inhabitants of the territories agree with the path of strikes and violence.

In his opinion, there has been a radicalization in the territories since the Camp David agreements were signed. In the past, too, there were periods of blows and clashes, but now all the PLO's efforts are focused on foiling any attempt at an arrangement.

The defense minister related that the decision to expel the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the Qaddi of Hebron was made during consultations held in Hebron after the murder. "We held a discussion, considered the issue and after that I called the prime minister and presented the conclusion and he approved it."

CSO: 4805

MINISTER WEIZMAN COMMENTS ON EXPELLED WEST BANK MAYORS

TA040943 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 May 80 p 1

[Article by Yona Shimshi, military correspondent]

[Text] The three public figures from Mt Hebron who were expelled yesterday are responsible for the murder because of the wild and open incitement they used. The incitement caused the atmosphere that made the murder possible, Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman said last night to DAVAR.

The defense minister said that in the past he had avoided taking the extreme step of expulsion because he was interested in finding a common language with the public leaders in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, in order to live in this area together, but it had now been decided to use a hard hand toward the inciting leaders. This had been decided several days ago and yesterday, after the Hebron murder, the decision was implemented.

Weizman said that he was not making personal accusations of murder against the people expelled, but they were responsible for the incitement they had used against the state of Israel. He expressed the hope that the security arms would discover the murderers and put them on trial.

The defense minister said that the defense establishment's policy up to now, which was criticized yesterday from several directions, had been correct and he did not regret it. "I still believe that we must find a way to live with the Arab population. However, the firmest measures must be taken to prevent a repetition of what occurred in Hebron. We proposed autonomy as a solution to the Arab population of Judaea and Samaria and Gaza, and they do not accept it. Our problem is to convince them to accept the autonomy. The PLO declared that it will do all it can to prevent the autonomy, it has declared war on our peace agreement with Egypt but, nevertheless, we must continue in order to reach understanding and the possibility of implementing the Government of Israel's autonomy program."

CSO: 4805

FRG'S STRAUSS COMMENTS ON PROSPECTS OF MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION

TA051233 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 May 80 p 2

[Article by Inga Deutschkrone]

[Excerpt] Franz Josef Strauss, the West German opposition candidate for the office of chancellor, who arrived in Israel yesterday expressed his disgust with "the terrible, abhorrent murder of innocent people" in Hebron. He stated firmly that "terror is not a means for the solution of political problems. In fact, it makes it much more difficult to find reasonable resolutions for the Middle East conflict."

Strauss, who arrived in Israel as the guest of the Israeli-German Parliamentary Friendship Association, leveled strong criticism at the Bonn Government's policy toward the Middle East.

In a special interview to MA'ARIV, Strauss said: "The formula according to which one should find a solution in the Middle East that will insure Israel and the Arab countries of security and permanent borders is an illusion if at the same time one demands the right of self-determination for the Palestinians." He added he heard this formula repeated on several occasions by the German chancellor and foreign minister "But if they are asked how this formula can be achieved, they turn mute and their wisdom disappears."

"Full recognition of the Palestinians' right of self-determination in accordance with the demands of Arab circles means a Palestinian state in the West Bank and perhaps also in the Gaza Strip," Strauss said. According to him Israel will be so narrow in size that it will require the guarantees of friendly countries and not of countries that threaten to annihilate it. In Strauss' opinion the Americans will not be too happy to grant such guarantees while the Europeans will not be prepared for this at all.

Strauss stressed that he has come to Israel for a tour of acquaintance with the land and its people, and expressed his admiration for Israel's achievements" and the heavy burden imposed on its army.

"I do not believe there is a danger of war in the Middle East as in 1956, 1967 and 1973. The Israelis are very strong militarily, although they shoulder a too heavy economic burden."

According to Strauss Egypt will not want another war against Israel. "Al-Sadat is the president of peace, not war. The other Arab countries will not be able to defeat Israel despite the Soviet support." Despite all this, the Middle East is still a tinder box, in his opinion, and several factors such as the oil, the events in Iran, the Soviet power policy in the region and the enmity of all Arab countries to Israel play an important role here. According to Strauss it is difficult to say which factor is more decisive with regard to the Middle East conflict.

"There is no magic formula, nor a wonder cure to the problems of the Middle East," Strauss said. "Solution will be possible only in stages, but such a solution requires a minimal mutual trust beforehand. On this issue President al-Sadat has worked wonders--Strauss believes--but he must not be left alone in the struggle." "It will be a great tragedy if Al-Sadat is deposed for any reason."

Strauss stresses, however, that any step that may be taken to settle the Middle East conflict should be taken along the lines of "secret diplomacy." Any step will be jeopardized the moment it is publicly discussed. "It is a foolish practice for politicians to cackle like egg-laying hens."

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

STRAUSS CLAIMS HE IS BRINGING NEW IDEAS TO ISRAEL

TA021148 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 May 80 p 1

[Interview with Dr Franz Josef Strauss, West German opposition candidate for office of chancellor, by Shlomo Shangar, in Bonn, date not given]

[Text] "I am bringing fresh ideas to Israel for a gradual solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict," Dr Franz Josef Strauss told me in an exclusive interview with YEDI'OT AHARONOT before his visit to Israel next week.

Strauss, the former minister of defense and minister of finance in the Bonn government, is a candidate for the post of chancellor in the upcoming elections. He will arrive in Israel on Sunday and during his 2-day visit he will meet with the prime minister, ministers and public figures.

"This is a visit I am really happy about, since I have not been in Israel since 1963," Dr Strauss said. He refused to expand on his plan for a solution to the conflict. He said: "At this stage I prefer not to present these proposals for public argument before I raise them in talks with Israel's leaders, but I have explained them to statesmen from the United States and Europe and I also intend to raise them in my upcoming meeting with President al-Sadat."

Among the things Dr Strauss said in the interview are:

--"Not even one of the democratic elements in Germany wants, supports or intends a policy whose significance would be the end of and the destruction of Israel."

--"It is true that, as older people and people used to politics, we know that there is a great distance between good will and the final results in history; the road to hell is paved with good intentions. But the wish to provide for Israel's security and well being, its future and its flourishing economic development, is shared by all the German parties."

--"It is my opinion that self-determination for the Palestinians...cannot be actualized unless Israel's right to security and its inhabitants' co-existence with those around them is first guaranteed."

--"I had reservations about the methods, not about the aims of detente. I have been repeating this for 10 years. I said that the lull was not strengthening, but destroying the peace. It is putting the West to sleep, is destructive to alertness. I must point out, with a touch of irony, that after about 4,000 days of "strengthening the peace" the architects of the lull have arrived at the collapse of their hopes and they are speaking about 1914...the conceding euphoria of the West toward the Soviet expansionism has contributed to the worsening of the situation. If, for one unusual time, Chancellor Schmidt is honest with himself, he must admit his guilt."

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTARY ON HEBRON, WEST BANK

Governmental Policy in West Bank

TA041224 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 May 80 pp 9, 10

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "A Hard Hand and a Vague Policy"]

[Text] The terrorist attack in Hebron was the most daring and strong action that has occurred in the territories since the 6-day war. It is true that there have been severe terror actions in Gaza (in one, two of the Arroyo family's children were killed) but, from the aspect of bravery, this did not resemble what happened in Hebron on Friday evening. The Hebron case was a military operation with all this involves: A planned ambush in which several positions were used; an action in the heart of the town; nothing to deter an attack on dozens of Israelis' a retreat and easily finding shelter among the population, and, of course--grave results from the point of view of the number of people killed and injured.

This attack was further proof of the fact that under no circumstances should we have settled in the heart of Arab Hebron and that, from the military aspect, it is impossible to prevent such attacks unless all the Arab neighbors nearby are actually driven out into an Arab quarter. One way or another, it is clear that this attack was proof of the decided degeneration that has taken place in Judaea and Samaria and of the fact that law and order there have been disrupted.

It is worthy of note that the Government of Israel has been avoiding dealing seriously with the issues connected with the West Bank for more than a year now. On Friday night, almost every minister had something to say about punishment in the territories and what should be done there, but the government as a body has been postponing a general, basic debate on what is happening in the territories for a long time. It is avoiding an exhaustive debate on the question of [indistinct] or explaining the security program in preparation for the debate in the autonomy committee. The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee is also a mirror for the decreased interest here in the issue, or the running away from it that can be seen. When last

week a debate was initiated, following the latest events in the West Bank, with the military governor Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-eli'Ezer attending, 10 out of the 22 committee members came to the meeting.

The people responsible for the issue are in fact avoiding dealing with the affair. Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman's attitude to the question of territories may be defined as doing everything possible to run away from it. He apparently feels that in the current situation--of the absence of a clear policy and of a vague line--he would do well to pull his hands out of the area. If we make an exception of yesterday's visit to Hebron, it seems to me that the minister responsible for the territories has not visited the military government, the Arab mayors and the Israeli settlements more than twice. The prime minister has not visited there at all. Here and there one of the ministers comes to the area for a short visit, such as that by the minister of housing, who came to locate houses for Jewish settlement in Hebron. This may be the most important issue for this government, but in fact it is running away from it.

The only exception is Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon, but all that interests him is the settlements, the Jewish settlers, and the issue of lands and their seizure. It is natural that in such a situation nothing is left to the military government and the IDF but to deal in firefighting. Instead of a policy, there is a set of reactions. And even what occurred in Hebron on Friday night is nothing but a reaction, and not the expression of a clear line originating in a political program.

On Thursday evening, when a group of senior officers and experts met in the defense minister's office to discuss the question of the West Bank, a decision was made about a strong-hand policy. Those present at this meeting predicted, they did not know. What was the feeling of those who took part in that debate? Not one of them thought that Israel was losing control over what was happening in the territories. One of those present was right in saying that even from the aspect of the events in the field, there had been more difficult periods. For example, the serious demonstrations in Nabulus and in the Kasbah in 1976 (when demonstrations began against the imposition of excise tax law in the territories).

Factually this is true, but from the political viewpoint the situation in the West Bank today is completely different. The general atmosphere there is that the Palestinian state is standing on the threshold, that all that is needed to achieve it is another light push and that it is only a question of time. Among the young people, the youth and the students, the feeling is that the danger involved in demonstrations, riots and breaches of law and order is not great. Those who take the risk of going to jail are not in grave danger since, in any case, when the state is established they will be freed.

[TA041247] The level of expectations in the Arab public in the West Bank is very high and it is growing daily. One small spark is enough to set a fire burning. There has also been a change among the leadership.

This, it seems to me, occurred after the Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah affair. Things that up to a few months ago the leaders did in secret they are now doing in public. This begins with extremist decisions, a call for strikes and a boycott and goes on to violations of the law and the governors' orders. The Arab leadership in the territories feels itself to be stronger, more confident. They quite rightly translate the international decisions in favor of the Palestinians and the Israeli embarrassment as power and strength.

The result is that anyone who takes a stand there that is more moderate than that of the PLO is putting his life in danger. The extremists from the West Bank leadership have the upper hand. It is sufficient to glance at the list of members of the National Guidance Committee to see that the accepted decisive line is that of the Rejectionist Front. To be in the Rejectionist Front is to be in good company. There is no more Hashemite-Jordanian line and school of thought. Instead of this, there is a Jordanian-PLO school of thought. But it does not have the upper hand in the territories.

Matters have reached the point where one of the leaders of the former pro-Jordanian line in the West Bank, who had been known for his moderation, recently called upon the PLO leaders in Beirut not to make a mistake and be tempted by a proposal coming from the United States, to give Israel peace in return for a retreat from Judeaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. At most, so he demanded, there should be agreement for nonbelligerency. The rest should be left for the continuation of the negotiations and the political developments, which are not to be Palestinians' disadvantage.

There has been a parallel development among those in Israel who are responsible for what is happening in the territories. Because of the polarization in the Palestinians' position, the feeling that "there is nobody with whom to speak" has grown. But, at the same time, a dangerous feeling has developed, that the government does not have the means to react to events. The absence of a government policy is leading to a sort of political chaos, but is also binding the hands of the military government in its reactions. For example, people have pointed to the fact that for many months the defense minister has avoided reacting firmly against anyone caught in acts of terror and incitement. For example, he rejected the proposal to blow up the house of the person who murdered two Israelis in Gaza, who had been visiting the town, with a hand grenade.

Last week one of the heads of the security establishment told me, complaining, that it was in fact impossible to expel inciters without violating the instructions of the legal adviser (Baraq) and causing mass rioting. In the past, when the decision was made to expel al-Natshah (in the meantime his return has been permitted) it took 13 hours and 20 minutes from the moment of the decision to his border crossing. It was because of the new restrictions that, according to him, there had been another example of a student who incited murder through leaflets. The decision to expel him was made on

28 January, his appeal to the high court of justice was postponed to 3 May and he was only expelled on 5 May. "We are emasculating ourselves with our own hands and in such a situation, it is impossible to keep law and order," the man said to me.

But the truth is that the IDF has not succeeded in creating a situation where the Jews living in Judaea and Samaria will also keep the law and be scrupulous about the order. The fact that the settlers took the law into their own hands in Halhul some months ago without the authorities reacting to this, even though they knew a great deal about the planners, invited further actions. We saw this last week in al-Birah, in the shattering of windshields, and in the distribution of leaflets in Nabulus. The claim has again been heard from settlers and in other places, that the Arabs only respect force, but this time the reference is not to IDF retaliation operations, but to those of private elements who necessarily work in an underground. According to all the signs, it is no longer a question of a sporadic action by certain people in this or that settlement in Judaea and Samaria, but of regional, general organization, including signs that it is also being nourished from outside Judaea and Samaria.

[TA041330] So much for the Jewish inhabitants. However, the grave matter regarding the Jewish role in the degeneration is what happened with Rabbi Kahana and his group. They deliberately came to break the law, disrupt order and inflame feelings. The fact that they entered the area easily and acted without being disturbed, without the IDF using a firm hand against them on the spot are grave failures.

The murder in Hebron again places us at a crossroads. It shows there is polarization among the Arabs, but it will also lead to polarization among us. If the announcement by the heads of the local councils--who stopped their hunger strike yesterday--that the prime minister has promised them that in the future private land in the territories will also be requisitioned for settlement purposes is correct, this is positive proof of the polarization. Extremism feeds extremism. It is also clear that the claim that there are good neighborly relations between the Jewish settlers and the Arab inhabitants is unfounded.

The connecting link is the IDF and the military governor. The IDF finds itself mediating when extremists from both groups do all they can to deepen the gap. There are elements in both populations--the Jewish and the Arab--who are interested, each for different reasons, in causing the IDF to increase its involvement in the territories.

It would be an error to think that all this may pass without affecting the negotiations with Egypt. On Thursday, Weizman inclined toward taking a hard line so as, among other things, not to permit disruption of the autonomy talks. Now, after the Hebron murder, it is clear that those among us who claim that Egypt--and certainly not the Palestinians--should not be

permitted to decide what is important regarding security in the territories and how to fight terror will become stronger. The Egyptian prime minister's warning on this matter will change nothing. Neither will a declaration such as that by General 'Ali, who said that the murder in Hebron, which had undoubtedly been planned long in advance, was certainly a reaction to the killing in 'Anabta the previous day of the Arab youth who attacked the military governor with a knife.

West Bank Problems

TA061202 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 May 80 p 11

[Article by 'Amos Ayalon: "To Die for Hebron"]

[Text] The authorities have decided upon a "strong hand" policy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But the main question now is not one of policing, as the settlers and people inside the government doing what the settlers want them to do, purport to present it. The main question is not what violent measures will permit Jews and Arabs to live together in Hebron, but--more than ever in the past--what political measures will permit Jews and Arabs to live separately--and peacefully--in this divided land whose situation is degenerating to that prevailing in northern Ireland.

This is the great question. This is what must be thought about. The government's refusal to discuss it seriously--out of a barren doctrinarism, internal weakness, intellectual superficiality and the ignoring of historic experience both here and in other countries--does not change its importance. The civil rebellion spreading through the West Bank does not originate from the lack of alertness, possibly temporary, of the security forces, but from the absence of a political solution to the protracted conflict between two peoples--whose homeland this is, both of whom want to stand up in their own right and neither of whom want to be ruled by the other.

For decades the Arabs have tried to avoid such a political solution by force of arms. Now it is we who are refusing. One delusion, regrettably, gave birth to the other. It makes no difference that the original refusal, that led to many bloody wars, was that of the Arabs. We are more interested than they are in a solution.

We will not reach a solution that will put an end to wars, and perhaps to terror, if we say, as they said in the past, "The whole country is ours." Without a political solution--that is, territorial compromise--the wars will continue.

Anyone who says that we have a "right" to settle in Hebron and to requisition land and houses, must take a hard look at this reality. No "religious" or "legal" rhetoric will change it. This is not a controversy between theologians or lawyers before some sort of heavenly tribunal. This is a

national dispute between two peoples, who, in their distress-or in their fury--used violent measures in the past and, in the absence of a territorial compromise between them, set off a series of wars whose end is not yet in sight.

We have security interests which are not just theoretically "legitimate"; they are also recognized in fact by both the United States and Egypt, as well as Jordan and no few Palestinian activists in the West Bank and Beirut. The prime minister of Egypt proposed that the West Bank should remain permanently demilitarized. Up to now we have not been prepared to discuss this proposal. Under this, we insisted on the actualization of a caricature of a "self administration" for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with a continuation of the settlements and large-scale requisitions.

The Egyptians and the Palestinians, and not without reason, regard this as the first step toward future annexation.

If there is still any chance of settling the conflict through political measures, this chance will now be decreased, and perhaps disappear completely, should we pin our hopes on purely policing measures in order to bring back order to the West Bank. Regrettably, this is exactly what we are doing at the moment. Furthermore, the government--mainly out of weakness--intends to requisition tens of thousands more dunams and this time, of private land, in order to calm down the settlers who, by their violence in Ramallah, made no small contribution to a speeding up in the general process of degeneration between the two peoples.

Defense Minister Mr 'Ezer Weizman oversimplified his work when he said, after the murder in Hebron, that "It is not worth analyzing what was right and what was not right" up to now in our policy in the territories. And this is exactly what the government should have been doing now, and is not doing.

[TA061207] We did right in establishing military bases on the Jordan from where it is possible to defend Israel and perhaps prevent an attack on it from the east, but we did not do right to scatter civilian settlements in the field and drive Arab inhabitants away from their land, and in order to defend these settlements now, military forces as large as--or larger than--those guarding the borders are needed.

Moshe Dayan did right at the time to open the bridges and not cut off the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from their natural rear in the Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab world. We did not do right to permit, and continue now to permit, violent colonialists--even if they are called "worshippers"--to settle on requisitioned land, most of it private, in the midst of a dense Arab population, an Arab population regarded by many of the settlers as subhuman, without the most elementary civil rights, animals, as one settler phrased it when he said this week on television: "If you do not keep a bridle on the Arab, he will run amok."

We did not do right when, for a fairly long period of time, we permitted these colonialists--who are opposed to peace with Egypt--to take the law into their own hands and to run amok in the streets of Arab towns, something we would never have permitted Arabs to do in the streets of our towns and settlements.

The government did right to oppose the populating of the Hadassah building in Hebron and demand its invaders to evacuate it. It did not do right not to insist that this order be obeyed. It is hypocrisy to claim that the minister of defense is responsible for the murder in Hebron. If anyone is "responsible" for it, then it is those who prevented the defense minister from evacuating the invaders from there, even by force, if necessary.

We did right to permit the growth over recent years of a new political leadership in the West Bank, a younger, more popular leadership, more credible to the rising middle class, the radical intellectuals and the youth than the old leadership of feudals and "notables" or the various kinds of "Uncle Toms," some of whom collaborated with the conquering authorities for selfish, economic reasons. These new leaders do not "love" us, to use an understatement. Al-Sadat does not love us either--but, like al-Sadat, these leaders are at least practical. They know very well that Israel cannot be destroyed--they understand that they have to live with it, even though they have declared their loyalty to the PLO in Beirut. Over the last few years they have grown to be--if not an alternative to the PLO, at least a constructive counterweight. This constructiveness sprang from the increasing realism that was forged in contacts with Israel and with Israelis. It was on this basis that they said, to anyone who was prepared to listen, that they were prepared to live in full peace with Israel, but in their own independent state, either linked or not linked with the Kingdom of Jordan. We did not do right when we expelled--to Beirut(!)--two of the most outstanding and serious of these new leaders. The decision to expel them was made in a blind rage, as a shot from the hip. It was terrible. I fear that we will yet regret it. We are continuing to treat the symptoms of the problem instead of its roots.

Do we want to eliminate the current leadership of the West Bank? If so, this is a dangerous illusion. We are dealing with a many-headed hydra. From each head we cut off others will grow, and uglier ones.

West Bank Situation

TA021159 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 May 80 p 25

[Article by 'Aqiva Eldar: "The Rules of the Game Have Changed"]

[Excerpts] The settlers do not want autonomy and the West Bank Arabs do not want the settlers. For the moment, a battle of window panes is going on between the sides and the victims are Israeli buses, military vehicles

and private cars shattered on Ramallah's main street. Four members of the Bet El settlement, and with them Rabbi Kahana, are being held under arrest. Five Arabs from Ramallah are recovering from wounds from the attack on the people by the Jewish Defense League, which provoked the riots.

The commander of the Judea and Samaria district accuses the National Guidance Committee "which is disturbing the very idea of peace and causing a process of polarization among the inhabitants." Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'Ezer ("Fu'ad") has over the last few weeks been faced with the crest of a campaign in which he was defeated in every case. He declares that anyone who throws stones will not be released and promises that "we will not let the area be turned into the Wild West." But in reality it appears that the military government is being forced to abandon the arena to two hawkish, extremist bodies.

In the past the military government was careful to strangle political organization in the territories while it was still in the womb and the leaders were cautious. Now the members of the National Guidance Committee hold their rallies under the nose of the military governor. Commercial strikes that produced sharp reactions have now become routine and the military government is already saying "If they want to close a store, that's their problem."

The National Guidance Committee is in fact acting outside the law. "We are keeping a careful watch over its actions," Brigadier Gen Ben'Eli'Ezer says, and at once adds "However, the main struggle with them is a political matter which is not within my authority." The mayors interpret the restraint concerning the actions of the committee as the weakness of the authorities. They are being encouraged by this and have much more influence among the population.

With the increase in the strikes marking Fatah Day, the Day of the Prisoner, Independence Day and other events, violent actions in the West Bank streets are also increasing. The security elements completely reject the explanation that a sort of operational Palestinian underground is being organized to disrupt the order with the aim of foiling the autonomy talks. It is still estimated that the stone-throwers are children, perhaps incited youths who in this way are expressing their hatred of the Israeli Army or the settlers whose proximity is not desired.

The district commander enumerated 24 cases of shattered windshields over the last 2 weeks, two cases of molotov cocktails and one case of a dud grenade thrown at Israeli vehicles. However, the military governor denies the talk of a "civil rebellion" and prefers to describe the situation as a "process of radicalization" or "a rising wave of riots."

The worsening is not only expressed in the number of incidents and strikes. Brigadier General Ben-Eli'Ezer thinks that "if they had hand grenades and other weapons at their disposal, they would not hesitate to use them."

Members of the National Guidance Committee are fighting an open battle for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The settlers, under the leadership of Gush Emunim, are stepping up their fight against the Camp David agreements which, in their view, will lead to the "State of Palestine." The confrontation between the two bodies working and living in the same region was unavoidable. Brigadier General Ben-Eli'Ezer does not hesitate to say: "It is clear to me that the Arabs do not like us and do not want peaceful coexistence."

In Bet El the windshield shatterers are supported and "policy" is blamed. When the army cannot react to stone-throwers, they will "make order." In my talks with people from the Yeshiva, which shelters under the shadow of a military camp, I did not succeed in persuading anyone to say a word of condemnation for Rabbi Kahana's provocation in Ramallah or who even had the slightest reservations. This man continues to range throughout the West Bank and stir up riots and the military government's arm is too short to touch him.

It emerges that there is no need today for more than six or seven Jewish toughs to bring hundreds of youths to the Ramallah Municipality, armed with clubs and prepared to repel those who came to provoke and insult them. Anybody who believed that the military government had the power to stand firm and contain the clashes between the extremists was proved wrong this week. It is difficult to explain the helplessness the military government exhibited on Monday against a tiny group of Rabbi Kahana's fanatics.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTARY ON AUTONOMY TALKS, CRISIS

Failure To Convene Joint Session

TA051259 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 May 80 p 11

[Article by Dan Margalit: "Between 'All' and 'Mainly'"]

[Text] The organizers of the Herzliyya Accadia Conference tried to turn Ambassador Sol Linowitz' failure to convene a joint session of the three autonomy delegations into a success. They wanted to present it as "the wonder technique of Linowitz" who prefers intimate talks behind closed doors to a ceremonious opining covered by the press. Israeli officials aided the Americans in this by arguing that the absence of the plenary session was filled, as it were, by significant progress on several issues and that signs of Egyptian flexibility may be emerging as well.

However, the Egyptian refusal to hold a plenary session (to date) expressed the difficulties and weakness of the position in which the U.S. finds itself. After Begin's no's to President Carter and especially the weakness of the U.S. policy in Iran, the Israelis and Egyptians reacted with a shrug to the requests with which they were beset by Linowitz and his assistants. The Americans had nothing to offer to the parties except for the recommendation to overcome the present fears and doubts in favor of a future that is one of vision rather than reality.

The advice was mainly directed at Israel but this message too was difficult for the Americans to drive home. Nobody wants to mar Israel's security--the Americans claimed--but what does this mean? They, of course, refused to accept the view expressed by Agriculture Minister Sharon that U.S. soldiers will not be called upon to act against terror in the territories on behalf of Israel, and that the IDF should then be allowed to handle this. If Israel can send its soldiers to any house in Nabulus in the middle of the night and detain any suspect it pleases--what is left for the autonomy then?

The U.S. position on this issue relies chiefly on the word "mainly." The autonomy's strong police force--as put in the Camp David accords--will be

the "main" element in charge the internal security issue. When a terrorist is found, he had better be detained by local policemen. However, the word "mainly" leaves, as far as the Americans are concerned, sufficient living space also for Israel from the security point of view since the IDF has room for independent activity in extraordinary cases within the gap which exists between "mainly" and "all."

If the Hebron massacre occurred in the autonomy for example, and if Israel knew the identity of its perpetrators, it would have probably taken action to capture them by itself and not entrusted this delicate task to the autonomy's police.

Prime Minister Begin had done well not to reject the [U.S.] proposal outright but to transmit it to jurists for scrutiny. In actual fact the proposal has remained in his drawer and the Americans understand this. They know his motives: he reserves to himself the option to soften Israel's stance on this issue in the future and he is chiefly examining whether there is a wide enough space of action between the "mainly" and the "all" for the Israeli defense forces when necessary.

The chances of this approach seemed slim at the end of last week. The murder in Hebron has achieved its goal from the perspective of the terrorists who want to foil the autonomy talks. It has weakened the status of Defense Minister Weizman in the cabinet to an extent that will probably almost paralyze him in the coming days. His inclusion in the autonomy talks at the end of last week was interpreted as an Israeli signal that under certain conditions Israel will agree to set up a committee that will deal with the autonomy's security problems. The report that understanding has been reached between Weizman and Sharon on the IDF's deployment map has reinforced the Egyptian-U.S. hope that the talks on the important security issue would be launched on practical lines.

However, the criticism leveled at Weizman at the end of the week has undermined, at least temporarily, his ability to propose to the government that it act flexibly although it has strengthened his image as a statesman who insists on his policy when it is under crossfire as well.

The Americans in Accadia therefore fear that the Egyptian guests will give up the rest of the pleasant stay on the Herzliyya Beach and pack their suitcases before the end of the week now that the assumption that Weizman's presence would promote the chance of establishing a security committee has weakened.

At this stage the Americans are trying "to gain time." They want to maintain the proper framework of talks even if their contents is not that promising. Their continuation leaves a chance that the Hebron trauma that is reminiscent of the 1929 massacre will ultimately pass and that real progress may be made in Egypt.

It is in fact the U.S. weakness that prevents it from luring the parties with reliable bait or painfully bending their arms. Linowitz arrived in Herzliyya and will proceed to al-Jizah in Egypt if the marathon talks continue and with two channels of action ahead:

A. To aim at initialing some kind of an agreement by 26 May. The Americans assume that the two parties may reveal interest in such diplomatic cosmetics that may be the only practical product at the end of the present round of talks.

B. It is clear now that it is impossible to achieve a "full autonomy" whose meaning will be identical in Jerusalem and Cairo. "The model" is neither Israeli nor Egyptian but the wording of the Camp David accords, something vague that can be differently interpreted by each of the parties. The Americans see a ray of vague hope in the basic political data: the Israelis view the autonomy agreement as final while the Egyptians view it as a temporary interim situation. Linowitz' task is therefore to try to form an agreement on the basis of the gap existing between the two conceptions while the Israelis believe that with the excuse of a temporary arrangement the Egyptians will be able to agree to some of Jerusalem's demands which are unacceptable to Cairo on a permanent basis.

Attempts To Pressure Israel

TA060859 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 May 80 p 1

[Article by 'Oded Zaray]

[Text] The Egyptian tactics, evident yesterday in the intransigent presentation of the security issue and the suspension of the continuation of the talks dealing with this issue, were intended to put pressure on Israel; to gain a propaganda achievement in the international arena; and to put U.S. reaction to the test.

This also emerges when making a comparison between the declared Egyptian position on the security issue--as it was explained by Gen Kamal Hasan 'Ali in an exclusive interview with HA'ARETZ on Sunday--and the position he himself detailed yesterday at the informal plenary session [of the autonomy].

The attempt to put pressure on Israel not only takes the form of presenting a far-reaching position on the security issue, which shocked the Israeli and U.S. delegations, but holds up the work of the subcommittees and the discussion of other important, substantive issues.

The cancellation of the reception the Egyptian ambassador was scheduled to give last night for the members of the three delegations (with the attendance of prime Minister Menahem Begin) to a certain extent fits in with the Egyptian tactics. There is no doubt that these tactics may create an atmosphere of

crisis, but it is reasonable to assume that the Egyptians are, in fact, not interested in a crisis now. Last night it appeared that the Egyptians understood that they could not, even among the Israeli ministers they call "moderates," find a partner who would agree to accept their position as a basis for negotiations. Last night the Egyptian delegation met and the protracted deliberations it held apparently proved an attempt to find a middle path for today's continuation of the negotiations.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

NEW LABOR PARTY MEMBERS--Knesset members Me'ir 'Amit and David Golomb will join the Labor Party this week when the Knesset summer session opens. An agreement on this was reached at a meeting held on Friday in the Labor Party building. The two spoke with the chairman of the Labor Party, Mk Shim'on Peres, and with the secretary general, Mk Hayim Bar-lev. [Text] [TA 041030 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 May 80 p 2]

SMUGGLERS NETWORK DISCOVERY--A route of smuggling goods from Lebanon to Israel has been uncovered by the security branches lately. The smugglers managed to bribe the IDF soldiers and to smuggle carpets and cigarettes worth tens of millions of Israeli pounds across the border. Lebanese and residents of Israel and the West Bank are members of this network. Twelve suspects have been identified so far. These consist of three IDF soldiers, a Janin resident, two Lebanese and six druze from the villages of Abu Sinan, Kafr Yasif and Peqi'in in the Galilee. [Yitzhaq Ben-Horin] [Excerpt] [TA051037 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 May 80 p 1]

PRIVATE CONSUMPTION DOWN--There was a real decline in the per capita private consumption in the last quarter of last year and the first of this year. This has been reported by the finance minister's Economic Adviser's Office. The consumption went down by 5.5 percent last year and it covered all the goods and the services. At the beginning of this year, this trend continued. [Text] [TA051310 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 4 May 80 TA]

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE REPORT--About 29,000 Israelis are looking for work today, of which nearly 7,500 receive unemployment compensation. The number of unemployed is rising in the big cities and declining in the development towns, according to data of the employment bureau. [TA070723 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 6 May 80 TA]

APRIL ECONOMIC DATA--In April the government injected only 0.2 billion Israeli pounds into the economy due, among other things, to a decrease in the funds for the government ministries. During April the government also collected 2.5 billion Israeli pounds through bonds and increased its income from taxes. [TA031414 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 1 May 80]

FRENCH, ISRAELI SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION--The French Government is interested in scientific cooperation with Israel, especially in the sphere of solar energy. The French deputy secretary of state to the premier (research), who is currently visiting Israel, said that Israeli-French Cooperation in the areas of science and technology has increased despite political differences. [TA060809 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 6 May 80]

C80: 4805

FORMER LEBANESE LEADER DISCUSSES CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 24-30 Mar 80 pp 22, 23

/Article: "President Rashid al-Sulh to AL-DUSTUR: al-Huss' Government Will Resign"/

/Text/ The issue of the government's resignation the coming spring was recently raised by political groups, and the reaction of its premier, Dr Salim al-Huss, was his statement "I will be the first to resign if the president wishes, but, in order to keep the situation in Lebanon quasi-stable, I never will resign under pressure or to achieve the biased designs of certain people."

The first person to raise this sort of likelihood was President Rashid al-Sulh, in whose period the civil war burst out. Neither President Camille Chamoun nor Shaykh Pierre Gemayel, nor a large number of independent coalition deputies, have ruled it out. In addition, President al-Sulh has been bluntly repeating this in his private gatherings, stating "I would prefer the advent of a government containing the majority of Lebanese within premises and principles confined to fighting Israel from within and outside and rejecting the bids by Begin, the Israeli prime minister, to drag Lebanon into a separate peace along the lines of what happened between Egypt and Israel."

For the first time, in an exclusive interview, al-Sulh has revealed that it was the Deuxieme Bureau which caused the civil war to break out in Lebanon in 1975, it was that also, not the al-Kata'ib Party, which contrived the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incident--and that it was the Deuxieme Bureau which assassinated Deputy Ma'ruf Sa'd.

We asked him, "Will resignation of the government face Lebanon with a complex political crisis? How would you view the political situation in that case?"

/Answer/ I do not believe that the resignation of the government would change or shift the political situation beyond making Lebanon face its responsibilities. Either a government is formed and its formation in

itself is a prelude to a reconciliation among Lebanese, or a government is formed to discuss reconciliation and pass the judgment that the political condition of Lebanon is not propitious for reconciliation; but I do not believe that the resignation of the government would lead to more than this, because, in most cases, if it is not feasible to form a new government, this government will remain--and that is to be frowned on. However, resignation will accelerate the discussion of the principles of reconciliation or means which will lead to it.

/Question/ The independent parliamentary coalition is playing a role which could hasten the government's resignation. Why, and what are the reasons?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the role of the parliamentary coalition could lead to resignation, bearing in mind that there is word that the prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, is not far from an acceptance of resignation or isolated from an acceptance of coalition. As I have said, what is desired is a government whose formation will be the prelude to reconciliation among Lebanese.

/Question/ Some political sources have said that President Sarkis may use the independent parliamentary coalition as a card to exert pressure on the government, on grounds that some differences in viewpoints have appeared between him and the prime minister. What is your opinion?

/Answer/ That is being said, but I rule it out, because the members of the coalition who are alluding to discussion of this issue are not influenced by anyone. As to the differences in viewpoints between President Sarkis and al-Huss, this is not my business.

/Question/ What is your conception of the next government and who will it choose as its premier?

/Answer/ If it were up to me I would prefer to have a government come in which would comprise the majority of the Lebanese within premises and principles confined to fighting Israel from within and outside, rejecting the bids which Begin presented to Lebanon, putting a limit to all armed phenomena in Lebanon, imposing the authority of the government on all Lebanese territories, carrying out the Bayt al-Din resolutions and embracing the principles approved by the independent parliamentary coalition. If these principles exist in any government and it can gradually achieve them, it will be able to bring Lebanon out of its trials and start to rebuild it in the manner its sincere citizens want.

/Question/ Would you be satisfied to form a new government if you were asked, and would you prefer that it be parliamentary?

/Answer/ The issue of the premiership is not at hand in my mind for a thousand and one reasons. My preference lies with a parliamentary government, because we are living under the aegis of a democratic-parliamentary

system in which a minister can be a deputy. Thus there is no justification for ruling the parliament out of the cabinet when one realizes that political experience in Lebanon has proved that whoever assumes power from outside parliament will not be more successful than a deputy who assumes it (Salim al-Huss).

/Question/ President Sulayman Franjiah has so far rejected any government in which the "Lebanese Front" would be a party but he rejects its exclusion from the discussion of reconciliation. What is your opinion on that?

/Answer/ Lebanese reconciliation is not as easy as some people think. President Franjiah has set out principles which the majority of the Lebanese have approved, as well as the Arab countries participating in the Bayt al-Din Conference, that is, a refusal to deal with Israel and condemnation of those who do deal with it. Therefore consequently one can say that President Franjiah's conditions will cause the failure of any attempt at a reconciliation.

The South

/Question/ What about Sa'd Haddad?

/Answer/ Sa'd Haddad's conspiracy is dangerous, in fact more dangerous than some people think, because Israel is working through his petty state and interfering in Lebanon's affairs through it, guaranteeing a border strip on Lebanese soil--but for the benefit of Israel and those working with it inside this country. I would not rule out that there is some sympathy for this officer among some groups inside Lebanon.

/Question/ During the period you witnessed as prime minister, from October 1974 to May 1975, what responsibility did you bear?

/Answer/ In the period I lived through as prime minister, I exercised power in unenviable circumstances, since I took over the cabinet with the start of the Israeli plot, which had not yet become apparent, against Lebanon, the Palestinian revolution and the entire Arab area. I tried my hardest to reduce the dangers of this plot and deter it within the limited resources available to any Lebanese ruler, and I can flatly say that when I left the government Lebanon was united, its institutions, especially the army, were all sound, and the Palestinian resistance was protected on its flanks, safe from all liquidation. In this respect I leave it to history to judge my work.

The Great Plot

/Question/ What about the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incident of 13 April 1975 and the assassination of Ma'ruf Sa'd? Were the events the beginning of a conspiracy against Lebanon?

/Answer/ As far as the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incident goes, in which dozens of innocent people and victims were massacred, this was perpetrated by the Deuxieme Bureau, and the proof of this is obvious, and everyone knows it. (al-Sulh had given a speech at the time in which he accused al-Kata'ib.)

As far as the assassination of Deputy Ma'ruf Sa'd goes, that was part of the plot hatched against Lebanon and the Arab region. I do not rule out the possibility that the Deuxieme Bureau had a connection with the murder of the late Ma'ruf Sa'd at that time, because the role of the Deuxieme Bureau, which was not to maintain and preserve security but the opposite, has been exposed.

/Question/ Why did you refuse to bring in the army after the 'Ayn al-Rummanah events?

/Answer/ I refused because many officers demanded that I do so to preserve the unity of the army, out of fear that it would be fragmented. Besides that, events were rapidly controlled in a manner which made bringing in the army unnecessary. In addition, one should bear in mind that the army had already been brought in in Sayda and withdrawn in accordance with the army commander's request, in the fear that it would be fragmented. Here one must state that the demonstrations which occurred in specific areas of Lebanon where slogans were raised against the Palestinians and the Arabs gave this army a factional character which caused the officials to refuse to bring it in. Here also I do not rule out the possibility that the Deuxieme Bureau was behind these demonstrations. The government at that time did not have the power to correct these conditions because the situation was tight and not propitious.

Thus the conditions of the army were not corrected until a number of months ago, after a long and difficult battle--after Lebanon and the Lebanese had experienced 4 years of war and destruction.

/Question/ How do you view the Arab situation following the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel?

/Answer/ I hope that the Arabs' statements will be coordinated, that the Arabs will set out a clear strategic formula to stand against the capitulationist tide which began with the Camp David agreements and that they will strive to unify their ranks and powers so that they can impose on the world, and especially on Israel, the Arab solution to the tragedy of Palestine--a solution which will guarantee the Palestinian people the legitimate right to liberate and return to their territory, at the same time putting a stop to Israeli aggressions against Lebanon so that Lebanon can live in an atmosphere of security and confidence. It is not permissible for the Arabs, who have the numbers, the materiel and the capabilities and powers, and are being appealed to internationally and by the Islamic world, to continue in their present state. Rather, as I have said,

they must set forth a clear, powerful strategy which will not allow any country to impose the Israeli peace on them, as happened in Egypt, and they must work at the same time, to return Egypt to its proper Arab context, which its current ruler has removed it from.

11887

CSO: 4802

COMING STEP IN PACIFICATION OF COUNTRY REVIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 22 Mar 80 pp 26, 27

/Article: "Lebanon: The Next Step: an Acceptable Army and Restoration of Normal Life to the Capital"/

/Text/ The government of the Lebanese has promised solutions to the country's crisis which will be realized by the end of next year, 1981, providing safety and security and extending the country's sovereignty over all its territories.

This promise came in a decree issued by the Lebanese Council of Ministers extending the tenure of the Chamber of Deputies one and a half years, instead of 2 years as was the custom the past two times.

Following the issuance of this decree, Lebanese official broadcasting assumed the responsibility for justifying the extension this time of a year and a half for the Council of Deputies, instead of 2 years, by stating that the government, headed by President Elyas Sarkis, had determined to move Lebanon from the security and political crisis in which it was embroiled and return it in a year and a half at the maximum to its natural state, making it possible to conduct new parliamentary elections in the country. As to the second reason, Lebanese official broadcasting, in one of its news bulletins, stated that President Sarkis was determined to proceed with the election of a new Chamber of Deputies a few months before his term ended so that it would be feasible for this new parliament to choose a new president for the country toward the end of 1982.

However, one minister has said that promises of this sort are more hopes and desires than absolute promises which come about through precise calculations, as some people try to imagine.

This minister said that the government hopes that security and political solutions to the Lebanese crisis will be reached between now and the middle of next year; even if these hopes are dashed and the situation remains as it is until the end of 1981, there is nothing to prevent the extension of this parliament's term for another period, during which it will also be asked to elect a new president for the country to succeed President Sarkis.

The fact is that, by betting that the country will return before the end of 1981 to a natural state which will make it possible to hold new parliamentary elections under natural security conditions, the government has relied on two basic elements:

The first element is that the government will continue the steps toward reconciliation it began recently. These have been embodied in particular in the issuance of the first declaration of principles for a national reconciliation, and therefore in the translation of one of these principles into the promulgation of a new defense policy for the country along with the agreed upon full opening of gates to a dialogue and reconciliation between the Lebanese government on the one hand and Syria and the Palestinian resistance on the other.

The second element is the bet that the next year will be the year for a practical initiative into the stage of approving a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East crisis on the basis of approval of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This matter is reflected positively and spontaneously in the Lebanese situation in a manner which will lead to a shift in many of the complexes still making up the Lebanese crisis.

This is in addition to other considerations which have made, and are making, Lebanese officials and some observers believe that international and Arab decisions have started to be taken to "liberate" Lebanon and bring it out of the state of confinement and bondage it has been suffering from for several years. These people think that the success of the initial steps which the government has taken so far is only the natural result of the existence of decisions of this sort. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that steps are now being started which could have been taken or adopted a year ago, or 2 years ago? What has been announced has not invented the solutions, which were very difficult previously.

Many are those who have wondered, and still are wondering, about the reasons which prompted the adoption of these conciliatory steps now and not earlier. However, few are those who know why now and not yesterday.

What there is no doubt about is that it is the facts which have changed, while in the present context the steps and initiatives remain as they were. What was rejected in the past has become accepted now; there are reasons and facts for this which a major Lebanese official raised when he said,

"As far as the Syrian situation goes, when Damascus adopted its decision to withdraw its forces from some Lebanese positions and areas, especially from the capital and suburbs of Beirut, it did not mean Lebanon specifically; this decision did not occur in isolation from its inclusive vision of the situation in the area and its position on new and anticipated developments. Rather, the decision to withdraw was the first step in the framework of a comprehensive plan of movement on the regional plane. Therefore one can say that when Damascus began to carry out its withdrawal from Lebanon it was thus translating its new conceptions and options into practical steps in the real world. Insofar as the decision to withdraw from

Lebanon is important, so is the decision of the regime in Syria to strike out with an iron fist at attempts to stir up domestic strife and disturbances in Syria important."

This type of thing had not occurred or crystallized before because the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had not yet been signed and the way had not yet started toward the normalization of relations, because the autonomy negotiations had not yet taken forward strides and because the President of Egypt had not yet gone to the point in his involvement where the Syrian position had become a major goal of the Camp David plans.

What applies to the decision of the regime in Syria also applies to the decision of the regime in Lebanon, despite differences in circumstances and details.

For a year, more or less, the Lebanese government had been continuing to insist on efforts to bring about a separation of the Lebanese crisis and the Middle East crisis, or treatment of the one in isolation from the other, through the efforts it made on the Arab and international levels both; it had not yet yielded, as is now the case, to accepting coexistence with the Middle East crisis and settlement of the Lebanese situation on this basis before the day the final solution to the Palestinian problem was devised.

Up to now, the view of the "Lebanese front" had not yet become wholly clear either, to the point which would satisfy it that it was necessary to support the legitimate Lebanese authorities within specific limits, because there would be no salvation for Lebanon except in strengthening the legitimate authorities and enabling them to move and adopt decisions, whatever the temporary price of doing so might be.

For a year or more or less, the view of everyone concerned with the matter had not yet become clear either because it was not in the power of Israel to go farther in interfering in Lebanese affairs than it already had. For instance, partition could not ultimately be an Israeli decision and Israel's entry into Lebanon to help one group or another could not ultimately be a purely Israeli decision.

Coinciding with all this, in terms of importance, is the fact that all Lebanese or non-Lebanese militia which have constituted, or still to this hour do constitute, little states on the Lebanese scene have become convinced that ultimately they cannot take the place of the government. They have also become convinced that there is no hope in continuing the war among themselves without end, and they have finally become convinced that it is necessary to establish a state of armistice or peace among themselves which will enable them to coexist, as the legitimate Lebanese government had decided to accept the solution of coexistence with the Middle East crisis.

The steps which the legitimate Lebanese authorities have taken since their first reconciliation have, conversely, made it apparent that full coordination between Syria and the Palestinian revolution exists on the basic issues which have developed and fermented in the area. The success achieved by Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus' discussions in Damascus did not turn into failure during the discussions he held with the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr Yasir 'Arafat, at a recent meeting which took place between them. The success of Fu'ad Butrus' talks in Damascus and with Abu 'Ammar have stressed that it was the program, not the persons, which was rejected in the past and inspired the attacks to which Minister Butrus was exposed from time to time.

It is said in some informed circles that the circumstances in the light of which the Lebanese-Syrian summit meeting between Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Ilyas Sarkis must take place cannot be distinguished or separated from the circumstances in the light of which the Lebanese-Palestinian summit meeting between President Ilyas Sarkis and Mr Yasir 'Arafat must take place. The circumstances are almost the same in both cases.

From now on, for specific period, the Lebanese president may not be able to move to translate the principles of national reconciliation contained in his letter, which the Council of Ministers approved, beyond the context in which he is moving now, namely approval of the defense policy, implementation of the Army Law, and implanting of Lebanese-Syrian and Lebanese-Palestinian relations on firm new bases. Such a movement will lead to a kind of security reconciliation, which is what is needed at the present time, when it is difficult to approve a complex Lebanese political reconciliation that would require a government of national reconciliation that is not feasible at the present time.

Therefore what seems important and basic as far as the president of Lebanon and his current government go is an effort to make a success of initiatives which will bring about a reconciliation of security through mutual understanding with Syria and the leaders of the Palestinian resistance.

It appears that at the present time the legitimate Lebanese authorities are not aspiring to more than the attainment of two basic things in the first stage, namely:

Thwarting the dictum which cast some aspersions on the Lebanese army, such as the claim that it was a factional unbalanced army, making it acceptable to various groups.

Relieving the capital, Beirut, and its outskirts from its current situation and bringing the Lebanese army in there to impose a state of security and safety which will normalize life there in a manner approaching, if not as natural as, that of the past.

If the aspirations of the Lebanese government cannot transcend these limits at the present time, that is because its resources, and the circumstances of the country, make it unable to absorb a greater dose than this; one could consider this to be within the limits and scope of the first conciliation initiative which the government has embarked on.

11887

CSO: 4802

ACTING INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES SITUATION IN SAIDA

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 15 Mar 80 pp 5, 11

[Report on press conference given by Acting Minister of Interior Nazim Qadri, in Saïda by Nazih Naquzi: "U.S. Ambassador Dean Hands Over \$700,000 in Aid for the South to Qadri in Saïda; Qadri Says: 'We Are Preparing Plan to Enable Security Forces to Exercise their Functions in Saïda'"]

[Text] Yesterday, Acting Interior Minister Nazim Qadri made this statement in Saïda: "We are in the process of holding intensive meetings with all authorities in the various regions, including administrators and members of the military, which we hope will enable us to extend the authority of the law and respect for the government to every spot in Lebanon."

Interior Minister Qadri was responding to questions from the press following a meeting with the governor of South Lebanon. Others present at the meeting included gendarmes company commander of the South Lebanon, Lt Col As'ad Dahir; emergency forces platoon officer, Cap Fadi Abu al-Zayn, and his aide, 1st Lt Roger Salim; first district commissioner of Bint Jubayl-Sur, Ghassan Haydar; the district commissioner of Hashayya, Musa Dabuq; and the secretary of the governorate of South Lebanon, Edmond Mish'alani. The president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, attended a portion of the meeting.

It was learned that the meeting concentrated on security conditions in the capital of South Lebanon and the requests which the gendarmes company has submitted for supplies of men and equipment to the security forces so that they can carry out their security duties in Saïda in light of the positive developments that have emerged from the meetings held with various groups in the city.

After the meeting, Minister Qadri gave the following reply to a question concerning the deployment of internal security forces to carry out their duties in South Lebanon: "The prevailing idea of the government is to send the army to the south in accordance with the agreement which was made between the Lebanese Government and the United Nations. This agreement stipulates that Lebanon should distribute its regular forces in all areas of the south in order to carry out moral and material measures to eliminate the effects of the Israeli occupation and the shelling, which Israel is still using against the villages to empty them of their inhabitants."

He said: "This makes it incumbent on the state that it draft a practical plan to end this tragic situation in the south--that is, where the international forces are located--and consequently implement the resolutions of the Security Council. However, recent unforeseen circumstances have frozen the situation. We hope that the reasons for this will cease to exist, so that this plan can be put into effect in cooperation and agreement with the Deterrent Forces and the Palestinian resistance."

Plan for Deployment of Army in the South

[Question] Mr Minister, you talked about the south. Saida is free of Arab Deterrent Forces and is in need of a legal Lebanese force. Despite meetings held with all factions concerned, and positive statements on sending internal security forces to carry out their duties, neither the internal security forces nor the army have so far come. What are the reasons?

[Answer] If I say that we are in the process of drafting a plan for the deployment of the army in the south, this does not mean that we have dropped Saida from our calculations. Without a doubt, one of our main obligations is to strengthen security and revive stability in the capital of South Lebanon, because this will have positive repercussions on all the areas of the south. We are in the process of preparing this plan which will ensure that the internal security forces will be able to carry out their duties and obligations in Saida and elsewhere.

We would like to say here that we are relying on the consciousness and understanding of the people of Saida--the same consciousness which has been demonstrated on more than one occasion and has been indicative of devotion, patriotism and far-sightedness. They have our thanks, appreciation and respect. This does not mean that we are forgoing our obligations. Rather, as I have said and say again, we are in the process of conducting practical and realistic studies through which we will be able to have the state assert its presence in Saida and elsewhere.

I say that we are currently in the process of holding intensive meetings with all the officials in the various regions, including both administrators and members of the military, which will enable us to extend the authority of the law and respect for the government to every spot in Lebanon.

[Question] The strength of the internal security forces in Saida is very small. It was much greater even in the recent past. Is there any intention to increase the strength of these forces in the near future?

[Answer] Without a doubt, the plan we are studying will include among all the other things an increase in the number of personnel and amount of equipment of the internal security forces, bearing in mind that we consider every man in Saida to be a national guardsman.

Climate of Stability

[Question] There are barricades that were removed by the Deterrent Forces. These are a sensitive spot with respect to the Saida-Beirut road. Is a rapid move being made to restore these barricades with legal forces in order to restore the trust of citizens?

[Answer] I came to Saida today, and I did not see anything which would impair security along the line extending between Beirut and Saida. This does not mean, however, that we will forgo the creation of a climate of confidence and stability in the minds of citizens. We will provide all the resources which will strengthen this trust and confidence. These include intensifying the patrols and strengthening (legal) Lebanese barricades at every sensitive spot which could possibly create an insecure or unpeaceful atmosphere with respect to the safety and security of the citizens.

[Question] The strengthening of the patrols in the south demands rapid action. Is there a plan which will be implemented swiftly in this connection?

[Answer] We are doing everything in our power to provide this climate, and we hope that we will be able to accomplish this task swiftly.

Governor of South Lebanon, Mr Halim Fayyad, then made the following remarks: "We have held a closed session with the acting interior minister and senior officers of security forces and of public security, and we reviewed security conditions in the south in general and Saida in particular. The justifications for strengthening the security forces in numbers and equipment were reviewed. As security forces in Saida are already carrying out their duties in the wake of the new developments, and as the political situation allows--or rather demands--that the role of the internal security forces be strengthened, it has been decided to hold a meeting in Beirut early next week between the minister of the interior and internal security officials to discuss requests which have been submitted regarding an increase in personnel and additional equipment."

Governor Fayyad added: "The citizen in Saida has a right to be provided with security and stability, and he has a right to demand that the state provide this through its legal organizations. This is especially so since Saida's political climate is characterized by relaxation and a positive tone. The general climate of unity prescribes studied and swift action to maintain security and order, strengthen the role of internal security forces and extend legal authority."

In another development, the security meeting held by the acting minister of the interior was preceded by the arrival of the American ambassador in Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, at the Saida government building where he presented Minister Qadri, as chairman of the Higher Committee for Relief, with a check for \$700,000. This sum was a supplement to American aid for the restoration of damaged houses in the south. The total aid has amounted to 9 million Lebanese pounds thus far. Others present at the handing over

of the check were Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, chairman of the Council for Development and Reconstruction; Hasan Farhat, president of the South Lebanon Council; and AID representative Peter Cody.

Ambassador Dean said: "I have come to Saida to present a new instalment of the aid which is being offered to the Council of South Lebanon in order to help defray social assistance for damaged homes in the south." Mr Dean added: "This aid has amounted to about 9 million Lebanese pounds thus far. I hope in the future to visit some of the villages in which reconstruction and restoration activities are taking place. We also hope to take part in development and social projects in this area in the near future." The American ambassador concluded his remarks by saying: "I would like to express my pleasure at this visit, especially since the road from Beirut to Saida is safe and security conditions are good."

8591

CSO: 4802

VATICAN RENEWS EFFORTS TO RECONCILE FEUDING MARONITES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 14-15

[Article by Rafiq Shallala: "The Vatican Reactivates Maronite Reconciliation Efforts"]

[Text] The exchange of hostages between the Phalangists and Zagharta forces has brought inter-Maronite unity into an earnest phase. The Vatican is preparing to activate this unity through its secretary of state, Cardinal Casaroli.

Observers feel that the path of national unity begun by President Ilyas Sarkis following his declaration of principles--the postulates--upon which the new Lebanon would be built is filled with difficulties and obstacles and sown with mines. It is up to the president, they feel, to defuse these mines one by one before they explode and destroy the train of unity, which continues to move forward at a slow pace.

The first of these mines is the inter-Maronite conflict that began in the wake of the Ihdin massacre of June 1978 and the events that followed, which put the Phalangist Party up against former President Sulayman Franjiyyah. This conflict did not remain just a political dispute, but escalated into a bloody struggle the price of which has been paid by many innocent inhabitants of the north, who have tasted the bitterness of shelling, forced exodus and abduction.

A glimmer of hope for a settlement of this conflict appeared on the horizon with the conclusion of an exchange of captives. The Phalangist Party returned six Zaghartians and a seventh northerner abducted last October on the 'Aynat al-Arz road, and the Zaghartians released 11 persons they had seized in towns of al-Batrun because of their former connection or their children's present connection with the Phalangist Party.

Four days after the exchange of hostages--which has not been completely finished since the two sides still hold a number of persons--the Zaghartians released the Phalangist member of parliament, Edmond Rizq. Rizq was abducted 3 weeks earlier while on his way to B'abda Palace for a meeting with President Sarkis. On the same day, he was taken overland first to Ihdin and

then to Zagharta. The families of the kidnapped Zaghartians claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of representative Rizq, which they carried out to pressure the Phalangist Party into releasing their sons held by Phalangists or their supporters.

Those who were involved in the negotiations to secure the release of the persons held by the two sides--including Maronite Patriarch Antonius Butrus Kuraysh, his deputy, archbishop Nasrallah Safir, and attorney George Jabr--faced many difficulties in persuading the two sides to withdraw their conditions, which were sometimes described as very frustrating. The basis for interaction on the question of abductions and counterabductions--namely that it was a matter of bargaining sessions through which a solution could be reached--was an erroneous approach, since the conflict between the Phalangists and Franjiyyah had gone beyond the political framework and become connected with the relationship of a group of northerners with the Franjiyyah family and some of the Zaghartian leaders. The intervention of certain non-Zaghartians further complicated matters rather than simplified them. The intervention actually came close to killing the hope that the problem of the abducted persons could be resolved.

However, the decision to exchange kidnap victims was made in the end. It was above all a Phalangist decision, since the Zaghartians had linked the release of representative Rizq to the release of individuals held by the Phalangists. Phalangist sources say that at the beginning they preferred not to intervene to put pressure on those who were holding the Zaghartians (they are supporters of Samir Ja'ja', who was accused of leading the Ihdin operation). Thus, they left the matter in the hands of the negotiators who were working actively in every direction. This was based on the assumption that those who kidnaped the Zaghartians were northerners wanting to "settle accounts" with President Franjiyyah, who had driven them from their villages and homes following the Ihdin massacre.

However, after the kidnaping of representative Rizq, the matter took on another character. With the freedom of one of the members of its political office curtailed, the Phalangist Party became directly affected by the matter. Phalangist sources say that this particular point was the subject of a debate in the Phalangist political office on whether to acknowledge the abduction of representative Rizq and half-heartedly continue dealing with the problem. The faction calling on the party to seek the release of representative Rizq and settle the problem of the abducted Zaghartians was able to convince the political office. Thus, the latter decided to release the Zaghartians to secure release of the Phalangists held by the "Rebels" (the military organization of President Franjiyyah's supporters) as well as representative Rizq.

Despite the Political Office's decision, the operation to implement it was not carried through.

The al-'Akawi incident then took place. In it, the lives of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil's young daughter and three of his associates were claimed, while those who committed the massacre clearly had the commander of the "Lebanese

forces" himself as their target. After the al-Jumayyil family had finished receiving condolences, diligent efforts for the release of Rizq, the Phalangists and the Zaghartians were resumed. Some of the difficulties were successfully overcome, and the exchange operation took place in a positive atmosphere. Representative Rizq returned to his home. He called for everyone to participate in bringing an end to the ordeal, getting the country out of the vicious circle it is in, and saving it from the violent whirlpool into which it will plunge again if reason does not triumph over emotion.

Based on representative Rizq's remarks--especially those in which he denied that President Franjiyyah had any connection with his kidnaping and those in which he called that his experience be turned to advantage in order to achieve positive developments among members of the Maronite family in particular, and members of the Lebanese family in general, observers concluded that signs of a thaw were in sight.

Informed Phalangist sources say that several factors were behind the party's decision, notably the following:

1. The party's desire to affirm in a practical manner its support for the president of the republic's move toward national unity by surmounting one of the main obstacles standing in the way of unity, namely the inter-Maronite conflict.
2. A desire to break the deadlock which had settled over the problem of the north, and move this problem in a positive direction rather than keeping it submerged in a quagmire of negative factors. These had demonstrated that victory was not feasible and that the "war of attrition" between the two sides could become protracted.
3. Preparation of the appropriate climate for the achievement of a solution to the problem of northern families who were driven from their homes and villages due to the conflict between the Phalangist and Franjiyyah groups.
4. The heading off of any attempt to disrupt the security situation in the north by persons who might have used the issue of the abductions as a pretext for such an action. This aspect is a fundamental one, because security conditions in the area of the north became unsettled recently.

Military tendencies emerged which disturbed officials and party members. Everyone feared that armed conflict might be sparked in the north, especially as "Deterrent Force" had been reinforced in mountain-top areas, particularly the al-Batrun and Basharrî districts.

5. Compliance with the desires which have been repeatedly expressed by secular officials and spiritual leaders, particularly members of the Maronite patriarchate and the Apostolic See.

6. The Phalangists' feeling that violence can only beget violence, and the party's desire to provide a suitable security climate in which the problem of the north can be addressed from a purely humanitarian standpoint.

In this connection, the same sources say that the Phalangist Party has obtained guarantees from official and religious sources that the question of the northerners who have been forced from their homes would be addressed and just solutions to their problem achieved.

Based on these factors, the same sources relate that the declaration made by representative Rizq following his return from detention in Zagharta that former President Franjiyyah had no connection with his kidnaping, and that Rizq was well treated, do not completely coincide with the facts. At least in the first days of his captivity, Rizq did not receive the kind of treatment he described. He was put in a cold place, even though he is not in good health, and was not provided with any of the facilities he requested. Moreover, his requests to visit or talk to former President Franjiyyah were refused on a number of occasions.

The Phalangist sources say that Rizq informed Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and a number of members of the Political Office about some of the things he faced during his detention. But al-Jumayyil asked him to forget the negative aspects and talk about the positive side, wishing thereby to avoid bringing the situation to a head and to maintain a peaceful atmosphere so that efforts to achieve Maronite unity and solve the problem of the north might succeed.

However, the question which remains unanswered is this: Does the release of the captives, and the positive attitudes taken by the two sides guarantee the achievement of a Maronite reconciliation?

Observers in Beirut feel that the exchange of abductees provides no more than a narrow opening. Although it might make it easier to keep the door open for Maronite reconciliation efforts, is not sufficient to achieve a reconciliation. This is because the conflict between the Phalangists and Franjiyyah is not superficial but deep-rooted. Its elimination requires major surgery for which the climate does not now appear to be appropriate. Perhaps the practical outcome of the exchange will be to spread a certain amount of tranquility over northern Lebanon, following elimination of what could have been a main factor in kindling a new northern war.

Observers add that Franjiyyah has many reservations about cooperation with the Phalangists, of which the problem of the abductions was only one. Some of these reservations, according to former President Franjiyyah, center around the Phalangists' hostile position toward the Syrians, Franjiyyah's charge that a number of Phalangist leaders are dealing with Israel, and his accusation that the Phalangists are trying to control the Maronites. Reservations such as these will not be eliminated by positive words conveyed by a mediator from one party or a clergyman from another. Falling in this category are the words reportedly said by former President Franjiyyah following the death of Shaykh Bashir's young daughter, which included expressions of grief and sorrow over the "innocent children who are killed as a result of the conflict of grown-ups."

Nonetheless, sources close to the patriarchal palace in Bkirki are hopeful that efforts toward a Maronite reconciliation will be renewed within the next few days, with the participation of the Vatican's secretary of state, Cardinal Augustino Casaroli. The cardinal is to visit Lebanon at the end of March to attend the ordination of Lebanese Monsignor Paulo Tabit as bishop following his appointment by the pope as Apostolic ambassador to the Antilles. Msgr (Carlo Fournio), the apostolic ambassador in Beirut, began preparations for this new papal initiative with visits to a number of prominent Maronites, including former President Franjiyyah.

These sources say that the Apostolic See is distressed by the continuation of the Maronite conflict, and that a final solution to this problem must be reached.

Maronite reconciliation is an avenue to political reconciliation. Will it be achieved? And to what extent are the factions concerned responding to the reconciliation efforts? The coming days will provide answer to these questions.

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BRIEFS

NEW GOVERNORS APPOINTED--The Syrian Government continued the reorganization of the administration in the northern provinces of the country, where troubles recently occurred, by appointing two new governors on Wednesday 19 March. A presidential decree appointed Mr Ahmed Assad Amrou as governor of Deir-El-Zor Province in the northeast on the Euphrates River. By the same decree, Mr Ammache Gideh was appointed governor of Idlib Province, in the Aleppo region, which has been in turmoil for some weeks. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Mar 80 p 3] 8696

COMMUNISTS ASK GREATER ROLE--Beirut--Two important reorientations of Syrian politics were announced semi-officially on Thursday, 20 March. Both may well remain theoretical. The first concerns a more active communist participation in power. The communists are already part of the power structure in the context of the National Progressive Front and in the government where they hold two portfolios. They should, from now on, be authorized to publish a newspaper and access to public office should be open to them. This is what their leader had asked for at the Ba'th Party congress last December-January, where he had been admitted as an observer. However, a major impact on Syrian political life should not be attributed to this measure, since the Ba'th Party is most jealous of its power and little inclined to share it. The second development concerns the renewal of Palestinian fedayee in operations from the Syrian-Israeli frontline on the Golan Heights. It was one of the Fatah leaders, Abu Ayad, who announced it in a declaration to Qatar. It is emphasized in Damascus that this measure "is not new" and that President Asad had kept the Palestinian leaders informed on several occasions. It does not mean, in any case, that the operations will pick up effectively on a large scale, first of all because the presence of a UN force makes them difficult; and because it might give Israel an excuse to reappraise the agreement on the disengagement of forces. Damascus is already aware of a renewal of tensions felt for the last 4 days in south Lebanon, where increasing bombardments by Christian militias and the Israeli army reached Saida, 80 km from the frontier and only 40 km from Beirut. There were altogether four deaths and 14 casualties, in several localities. Although they left Saida last January, Syrian troops risk being implicated in any Israeli military activities or Israeli instigated activities in Lebanon. [Text] [LE MONDE in French 22 Mar 80 p 10] 8696

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